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This paper considers the ability for "hate speech" to 
be regulated in New Zealand. Firstly, the author 
formulates a definition of hate speech, and evaluates 
the arguments for and against its regulation. The 
author proposes that hate speech should be regulated 
in New Zealand because of the harm it causes to its 
individual targets and to society generally, and 
considers what form regulation would take. The paper 
explores the mechanisms for regulating expression 
operated under the Films, Videos , and Publications 
Classification Act 1993, The Human Rights Act 1993, 
the Broadcasting Act 1989, and the principles of the 
Press Council. These mechanisms are revealed to 
inadequately regulate hate speech in New Zealand 
according to the author's definition, and accordingly, 
legislative reform is proposed. 
The text of this paper ( excluding abstract, table of contents, 
footnotes , and bibliography) comprises approximately 16, 800 
words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Hate speech has been a hot topic in New Zealand since the Living Word 
Distributors v Human Rights Action Group (Living Word/ decision came before the Court 
of Appeal. The case involved two videos , which degraded and denigrated 
homosexual people by reason of their sexual orientation. The videos were seen to 
promote the message that homosexual people were inferior. There was outrage from 
the homosexual community and human rights activists at the videos, which were 
touted as hate speech; material that should be banned. The Court of Appeal in 
Living Word, although recognising in the judgment of Thomas J that the videos were 
likely to cause serious harm to their targets and to society generally, found that the 
videos could not even be considered under New Zealand's censorship regime. The 
outcome of that case has led the author through the regulatory mechanisms put in 
place under the Human Rights Act 1993, the Films , Videos , and Publications 
Classification Act 1993, the Broadcasting Act 1989, and the principles applied by 
the New Zealand Press Council, in order to uncover whether "hate speech" can be 
regulated in New Zealand. 
The first task of the investigation is to establish exactly what "hate speech" 
1s. I will reach a formal definition of hate speech to be applied throughout the paper. 
The definition will be considered against the arguments for and against the 
regulation of hate speech to conclude whether it should be regulated in New 
Zealand. I will consider the possible alternatives for dealing with hate speech and 
determine what is the best approach for New Zealand. When those decisions are 
made, the curr:ent legal mechanisms that regulate expression in ew Zeafand, will be 
measured against my definition of hate speech. 
When the Living Word videos were remitted back to the Board of Review for 
classification, the Board attached to its decision a concern that the Court of Appeal's 
judgment had highlighted a gap in the law.2 
The Board highlighted what it considered to be a gap in New Zealand law. It referred 
to the distinction between censorship and anti-discrimination legislation and observed 
1 Living Word Distributors v Human Rights Action Group (Living Word) [2000] 3 NZLR 570, 
582 (CA) 
2 Re Gay Rights/Special Rights, Inside the Homosexual Agenda (8 February and 29 March 2001) 
Film and Literature Board of Review 3/2001, 2. 
6 
that publications such as these which contained a significant element of hate speech do 
not come within the reach of censorship regulation under the Classification Act; and nor 
does the Human Rights Act 1993 provide any sanction or remedy for such 
discriminatory publications. 
This paper seeks to determine whether those gaps exist, and if they do, seeks to 
recommend a way to deal with hate speech in ew Zealand. 
II DEFINING HATE SPEECH 
To define the term 'hate speech' 1s a difficult task. Karl Du Fresne 
comments,3 
[Hate speech] is one of those wondrously loaded phrases, like "social justice", that can 
mean whatever the user wants it to mean. 
There are many academic writings on the topic of hate speech, and the 
definitions of hate speech applied in them vary from author to author. The following 
section identifies some features common in the varying definitions, allowing the 
author to arrive at a workable definition to be used throughout the paper. The 
definition is a statement about what types of expression should be covered by the 
term "hate speech". If hate speech were to be regulated, expression that falls within 
the definition would be subject to regulation. 
A Message 
Hate speech is a message that is communicated to an audience. The first 
issue to be clarified in the definition, is through which media the message may be 
communicated. Hate speech is a label liberally applied to messages written or 
spoken using a variety of media. Hate messages may be spread through anonymous 
phone calls and letters, posters, books, magazines and pamphlets, radio, television, 
recorded phone messages, computer networks, text messaging, bulk mail, graffiti, 
and symbols (such as swastikas or burning crosses).4 The recent proliferation of 
computers and web-based technology has resulted in a marked increase in the 
3 Karl Du Fresne "Hate Speech" (2003) Media Watch <http://www.mediawatch.co.nz> (last 
accessed 12 July 2003). 
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amount of hateful expression in circulation, as it may be transmitted across the 
Internet, reaching a wider audience, in less time, with reduced regulation. 5 
This paper considers the ability of current legal mechanisms in ew Zealand 
to regulate hate speech. Each mechanism is limited in the media that it may 
regulate. For example, there is no scope to censor spoken messages under New 
Zealand's censorship regime provided for in the Films, Videos, and Publications 
Classification Act 1993. 6 
This paper considers the ability to regulate messages in a wide range of 
media, based on the assumption that the message hate speech conveys may be 
communicated, and cause harm, regardless of medium.7 Hate speech regulation 
would be ineffective if it did not cover certain media, as expressers of hate speech 
would favour an exempted medium. The medium used to communicate hate speech 
changes over time. Today, the Internet is widely used to distribute hate speech. Ten 
years ago it was not. The definition of hate speech must be flexible enough to cover 
whatever medium the expresser chooses to spread the message through. If New 
Zealand recognises the need to regulate hate speech in order to avert the harm it 
causes, it should regulate hate speech in all its forms. 
In order for hate speech regulation to cover all possible media, my definition of 
hate speech is not media specific. It simply requires a "message". For example, a 
message may be written in print; spoken in public places, either directly to its target 
or before a crowd; broadcast on television or radio; communicated through computer 
networks, telephone, or fax; or communicated though music, film, video, photograph, 
art, or symbols. Simply referring to hate speech as a "message" leaves open the 
possibility for it to be found to exist in many fonns. 
4 See Kathleen Mahoney "Hate Speech: Affirmation or Contradiction of Freedom of Expression" 
(1996) U Ill L Rev 789, 791. 
5 Yulia A Timofceva "Hate Speech Online: Restricted or Protected? Comparison of Regulations 
in the United States and Gennany" (2003) 12 J Transnat'l L & Pol'y 253, 256 . 
6 Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993, s 2. 
7 Kathleen Mahoney, above, 792. 
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B Form 
The next issue to be addressed by the definition is the type of expression that 
is covered by the term hate speech. Kent Greenawalt's writings on hate speech relate 
to epithets; insults communicated face-to-face that are derogatory to a class of 
society. 8 The derogatory insult is coupled with coarse language, communicating the 
epithet in a highly emotive and shocking way.9 An example of a hateful epithet is, 
'fucking faggot'. Including epithets within a definition of hate speech can be 
problematic, as the level of harm they cause depends upon the intent of the speaker 
and the context of the epithet. Saying 'fucking faggot' to a homosexual person in a 
nasty way may be harmful while jokingly calling a friend a 'bloody porn' may not. 10 
Other forms of hate speech communicate the message in an organised and 
calm manner and are sometimes backed up by false facts. It is often difficult to 
point to one word, or even one sentence, within the message that is degrading or 
hateful, but when taken as a whole, a message of inferiority is communicated. For 
example, 11 
Many concerned citizens and celebrities, anxious to lend their support to the fi ght 
against AIDS, unwittingly are endorsing the homosexual agenda, which demands 
the legalisation and acceptance of all kinds of deviant sexual behaviour; including 
prostitution and sadomasochism. 
This message, although not as obviously shocking as an epithet, has potential 
to do harm by influencing its audience to believe that homosexuals are inferior. 
Hate speech can combine both types of expression. Arguably, the above quote 
combines calm, reasoned expression with the mild epithet "deviant sexual 
behaviour". My definition addresses both forms of hate speech, separately and in 
combination. 
8 See Kent Greenawalt Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities, and Liberties of Speech 
(Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1995). 
9 Kent Greenawalt, above, 47-48. 
10 See Berriman v Sunday Star-Times (May 2003) New Zealand Press Council 922 
<http://www.presscouncil.org.nz/> (last accessed 29 September 2003). 
11 Jeremiah Films "Aids: What You Haven't Been Told" video transcript <http: //www.christian-
apologetics.org/html/Aids.htm> (last accessed 1 September 2003). 
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More recently, the term hate speech has been applied to holocaust denial, 
material that actively promotes the irea that the Jewish holocaust did not occur or 
has been exaggerated in history, and hate pornography. 12 These types of expression 
are generally regulated separately from other forms of hate speech and are likely to 
be interpreted in their own way through the courts. 13 My definition of hate speech is 
not intended to cover hate pornography or holocaust denial, as these forms of 
expression involve separate issues which may not be addressed by standard hate 
speech regulation. 
C Target Group 
In working towards a definition of hate speech, it is important to establish 
who hate speech may be targeted at. Some definitions require that the expression be 
directed at a traditionally disadvantaged or minority group, which assumes that those 
groups are more prone to discrimination and hate speech, and less equipped to speak 
out against them. 14 According to that requirement, a book that promoted the idea 
that European New Zealanders were greedy, dishonest, and money hungry would not 
be covered by the term hate speech, but a similar book about Jewish people would be 
covered. 
The requirement that hate speech be directed against minority or 
disadvantaged groups causes difficulty, because it may not always be obvious 
whether a target group has been disadvantaged. Moreover, there may be potential 
for hate messages to do harm regardless of whether the target group has been 
traditionally disadvantaged. European New Zealanders have taken offence to being 
called 'pakeha' although they are not a minority or disadvantaged group. 15 
Accordingly, my definition of hate speech is not restricted to expression targeted at 
traditionally disadvantaged or minority groups. 
12 See generally Kathleen Mahoney "Hate Speech: Affirmation or Contradiction of Freedom of 
Expression" (1996) U Ill L Rev 789 . 
13 Austria, Belgium, France, the Czech Republic, Germany, Israel , and Switzerland have specific 
p,rovisions for holocaust denial. See Canadian Criminal Code German Criminal Code, art 130. 
4 See Mayo Morgan "Talking About Hate Speech: A Rhetorical Analysis of American and 
Canadian Approaches to the Regulation of Hate Speech" (1994) Wis L Rev 1425, 1430. See 
Mari Matsuda, "Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story" , (1989) 
Michigan Law Rev 2326, 2357 in relation to racial hate speech. 
15 See Skelton v Sunday Star-Times (1996) 3 HRNZ 655 . 
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Another important issue is whether hate speech may be directed at 
individuals that are members of the target group. For example, during a recent radio 
broadcast, presenter Paul Holmes referred to United Nations Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan as a "cheeky darkie" and also said "[ w Je are not going be told how to live by 
a Ghanaian." 16 This message was targeted directly at Kofi Annan, however it 
degraded and denigrated him based on his colour, being dark skinned, and his 
ethnicity, being a Ghanaian. Accordingly it degraded and denigrated dark-skinned 
people and Ghanaians generally. 17 Such messages do have the ability to promote the 
idea that Ghanaian and dark-skinned people are inferior, regardless of the fact that 
they are directed at a single person. The author recognises that messages targeted at 
a specific member of the target group may come within the definition of hate speech. 
D Distinguishing Feature 
Hate speech addresses a distinguishing feature or characteristic of the target 
group such as race, gender, or sexual orientation. The next issue in defining hate 
speech is what distinguishing features are covered in the definition. 
The term hate speech was originally applied to messages about the targets' 
race. 18 The earliest legal mechanisms adopted by countries to address hate speech, 
applied to racial hate messages. For example, the remedies provided under the 
Human Rights Act 1993, originating from 1971 , apply only to colour, race, or ethnic 
or national origins. 19 
Critical race theorist Richard Delgado considers hate speech only in the 
context of racial hate messages. Delgado concentrates on racial hate speech, 
believing it to be more harmful than other forms of hate expression because targets 
have no control over their race.20 However, it may be argued that sexual orientation, 
16 Stuart Dye "Outrage at Holmes' darkie jibe" (27 September 2003) New Zealand Herald 
<http: //www.nzherald.co.nz/storydisplay.cfm?storyID=3525780&thesection=news&thesubsectio 
n=general> (last accessed 27 September 2003). 
17 "PM condemns 'darkie' comments by Holmes" (25 September 2003) Stuff 
<http ://www.stuff.eo .nz/stuff/0,2 l 06,2669532a I 0,00.html>. 
18 See Richard Delgado "Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and 
Name-Calling" (1982) 17 Harv CR CLL Rev 133 and Mari Matsuda "Legal Storytelling: Public 
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story" (1989) 87 Mich L Rev 2320. 
19 Race Relations Act 1971 , ss 9A and 25. 
20 Richard Delgado, above, 159. 
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gender, disability, and even possibly religion are also attributes that the target has no 
control over. 
In recent years the concept of hate speech has been applied to other 
distinguishing features that are considered to be grounds of discrimination.2 1 
Aligning the grounds of hate speech with the grounds of discrimination recognises 
that people who are subject to discrimination are often also subject to hate speech. 
The Human Rights Act 1993 sets out the prohibited grounds of discrimination in 
New Zealand, which include sex, religious belief, colour, race, ethnic or national 
origins, disability, and sexual orientation.22 However, the list also extends to a 
number of other grounds including family status, marital status, and age. These 
features are acceptable within anti-discrimination law, but should not be instantly 
reiterated in a definition of hate speech. The opinion that "prohibition of hate 
propaganda is not seen as synonymous with more general anti-discrimination 
protections" was recognised by the Court of Appeal in Living Word. 23 
The author does not restrict hate speech to messages directed at a person's 
race. However, the definition of hate speech cannot cover messages directed at all of 
the prohibited grounds of discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993. Such a 
broad definition would regulate too many forms of expression. My definition of hate 
speech specifically relates to expression directed at the targets' sex, religious belief, 
colour, race, ethnic or national origins, disability, or sexual orientation. It is possible 
that the definition will expand to cover more grounds over time, if the nature of hate 
speech changes. 
E Effect 
Perhaps the most important issue in defining hate speech is the effect the 
expression must cause before it meets the definition. How must the audience be 
affected? Must the effect be intended? 
21 See Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993, s 3(3)(e). 
22 Human Rights Act 1993, s 21(1). 
23 Living Word Distributors v Human Rights Action Group (Living Word) [2000] 3 NZLR 570, 
588 (CA) 582 Richardson P for the majority. 
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I Intention 
A requirement for intent in a definition of hate speech is necessary to ensure 
the term is not applied arbitrarily, broadly, or to situations where the expression is 
misunderstood and the expresser meant no ill will. An example may be jokingly 
calling a friend a 'bloody pom'.24 
What must the expresser intend to do? Article 319 of the Canadian Criminal 
Code requires the expresser to wilfully promote hatred. 25 But promotion of hatred is 
difficult to assess. Must the court interview members of the public in order to 
establish whether expression has promoted hatred? How do you define hatred? The 
requirement adopted in my definition is for the expresser to intend to degrade or 
denigrate a target group.26 To "denigrate" means to defame or disparage a 
reputation.27 To "degrade" means to bring into dishonour or contempt.28 
Intent is subjective. However, in order to assess whether the expresser 
intended to cause the effect an objective test will be utilised. Accordingly, whether 
the reasonable person would think the expression was intended denigrate or degrade 
the target group by reason of their distinguishing feature will determine the 
expresser's intent. 
Concern is sometimes expressed that the regulation of hate speech may not 
allow conunents to be made in a legitimately humorous context. My definition deals 
with humour through the intent requirement. If a message is innocent banter, not 
intended to -degrade any group based on their distinguishing feature , i-t will not have 
the requisite intent, and so will not be hate speech. 
24 See Human Rights Commission "Use of the word "Porn" 
<http: //www.hrc.co.nzJindex.php?p= l3826> (last accessed 30 September 2003). 
25 Canadian Criminal Code, art 319. 
26 See Jean Francois and Gaudreault DesBiens "From Sisyphus's Dilemma to Sisyphus's Duty? A 
Meditation on the Regulation of Hate Propaganda in Relation to Hate Crimes and Genocide" 46 
McGill LJ 1117, 1118. 
27 RE Allen (ed) The Concise Oxford Dictionary (8 ed, Oxford University Press, 1990). 
28 RE Allen (ed) The Concise Oxford Dictiona,y (8 ed, Oxford University Press, 1990). 
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2 Effect on the audience 
If expression is intended to denigrate or degrade the target group based on a 
distinguishing feature, but its audience is not influenced by it, is it still hate speech? I 
believe one of the major harms of hate speech is its power to influence its audience 
into believing and perpetuating its message.29 For this reason, a message should 
only be defined as hate speech if it is capable of having an effect on its audience. 
The next issue to be resolved within the definition is what fom1 that effect must take. 
Must hate speech promote hatred amongst its audience, or incite them to feel hatred 
toward the target group? 
Article 130(2) of the German Criminal Code makes punishable the 
dissemination of materials that incite hatred against segments of the population. 30 
Similarly, article 20(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) explicitly requires party states to prohibit by law "any advocacy of 
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence". 31 
Incitement may be difficult to prove. 32 How could a court ascertain whether 
hateful expression had invoked hateful ideas in its audience? Further, the ability for 
a message to incite may depend upon the nature of the message and the nature of its 
audience.33 Racial hate speech may incite racism in people who already have racist 
tendencies, while those without racial prejudices may dismiss it as incorrect and 
detestable. For these reasons, a requirement for incitement is not included within my 
definition of hate speech. 
The author assumes that a message intended to denigrate or degrade a target 
group based on a distinguishing feature, is likely to promote the idea that the target 
group is inferior amongst its audience. Mari Matsuda argues that the message of 
29 Sec Juliet Moses "Hate Speech: Competing Rights to Freedom of Expression" ( 1996) 8 
Auckland U LR 1, 185, 203. 
30 Gennan Criminal Code, art 130(2)-130(3). 
31 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171 , art 
20(2). 
32 Moses, above, 188. 
33 Moses, above, 189. 
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hate speech affects its audience whether they agree with it or not. 34 For example, to 
hear that Maori are all "dole-bludgP,rs" may seem detestable at first, but if the 
message is repeated, it will eventually effect its audience, leaving them to question 
whether the remark is not in fact correct. When a non-Maori next comes across a 
Maori person, the "dole-bludger" remark is triggered. It may be rejected, but it still 
arises and interferes with the audience's perception. 35 
There is no direct requirement m my definition of hate speech that the 
expression incite hatred in its audience; rather the expression must have the effect of 
promoting the idea that the target group is inferior. Promotion of the message of 
inferiority means that it is possible that the expression will arouse ideas of inferiority 
in some members of the audience, but that effect is not required. The definition 
adopted in this paper is similar in its effect element to the provision of the Canadian 
Criminal Code that prohibits wilfully promoting hatred against an identifiable 
group.36 
F Exceptions 
Many who oppose the regulation of hate speech fear the imposition of legal 
ramifications upon genuinely held religious or political opinions , matters in the 
public interest, and matters that are actually true. In order for a definition of hate 
speech to work effectively it must not be overbroad, and must not have a "chilling 
effect" on legitimate expression. Accordingly, my definition of hate speech includes 
a number of exceptions. It is possible that expression falling within the exceptions 
would fail the requirement for intent, however, due to the dangers involved in 
restricting the following types of expression, the exceptions will be expressly 
defined within the definition. It should be noted that positioning the exceptions as 
defences would in practice place a burden upon the expresser to justify its conduct. 
34 See Mari Matsuda "Legal Storytelling: Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the 
Victim's Story" ( 1989) 87 Mich L Rev 2320, 2339-2340 
35 See Mari Matsuda, above, for a similar example that I have modified for this paper. 
36 Canadian Criminal Code, art 320(2). 
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1 Religious opinion 
The right to manifestation of religion is guaranteed in section 15 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Bill of Rights).37 
Every person has the right to manifest that person's religion or belief in 
worship, observance, practice, or teaching, either individually or in community 
with others, and either in public or in private. 
There may be situations where a message that meets a prima facie definition of 
hate speech, would be the manifestation of religion. Consider a Christian 
organisation that publishes a video intended to express the view that homosexuality 
is dirty and immoral. 38 A court may find that the videos were intended to degrade 
homosexual people by presenting the message that homosexuals were immoral and 
dirty. Moreover, the videos may have the effect of promoting the idea that 
homosexuals are inferior. However, the videos reflect a religious belief genuinely 
held by some Christians. How can the expression of genuinely held religious 
beliefs, protected under the Bill of Rights, be prohibited? Consequently, my 
definition follows the Canadian approach, and makes an exception for the expression 
of religious opinion.39 The exception only exists for legitimate religious opinion and 
exception should not be hijacked by expression that has more sinister motives . 
2 Political opinion/public interest 
Grant Huscroft considers that regulating hate speech places a limitation upon 
the right to communicate political opinions or matters of public interest.40 I consider 
that providing an exception to hate speech merely for the expression of political 
opinions would not be appropriate, as much harmful expression is considered to be 
political speech. The Ku Klux Klan may be able to justify their racist and hateful 
expression based on an exception for political opinion. Similarly, Hitler's 
persecution of the Jewish people was considered to be a political issue. To provide 
37 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 15. 
38 Example similar to the videos involved in Living Word Distributors v Human Rights Action 
Group (Living Word) [2000] 3 NZLR 570 (CA). 
39 Canadian Criminal Code, art 3 I 9(3)(b ). 
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an exception for political expression may excuse the prototype hate speech that we 
are trying to prevent. 
However, there is a valid concern that the prima facie hate speech definition 
may catch some material that is a matter of public interest. Grant Huscroft provides 
the example of a message expressing concern that an influx of Asian immigrants is 
depleting seafood stocks in New Zealand. 41 Such a comment appears to be a 
stereotype about the dietary habits of Asians. The message may be assumed by the 
reasonable person as intended to degrade Asians based on their race, and further, 
may have the effect of promoting the idea that Asians are greedy. Races that are 
greedy may be seen as inferior. However, Huscroft argues that the depletion of 
seafood stocks is a serious environmental concern and that its debate is in the public 
interest.42 
Such expression, if established to be a matter of public concern, the 
discussion of which is in the public interest, would come within an exception to my 
definition of hate speech. This exception is used in the Canadian offence of wilfully 
promoting hatred against an identifiable group.43 Such an approach gives people the 
ability to speak out about matters of public concern. 
3 Truth 
There should also be an exception for expression that is true.44 Huscroft 
notes that truth is difficult to determine in the case of hate speech, because the 
expression is often an opinion and it is difficult to prove whether an opinion is true.45 
This paper assumes that where the message conveyed would prima facie be hate 
speech according to my definition, but it may be established that the message is 
based on true facts, the message will not amount to hate speech. Once more, this 
40 Grant Huscroft "Defamation, Racial Disharmony, and Freedom of Expression" in Grant 
Huscroft and Paul Rishworth (eds) Rights and Freedoms: The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993 (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 199-202. 
41 Huscroft, above, 199. Huscroft's example was based upon a comment in 1994 by Ngatiawa 
spokesman Maanu Paul. See NZP A '"Take everything' claim condemned" ( 19 October 1994) 
New Zealand Herald, l. 
42 Huscroft, above, 200. 
43 Canadian Criminal Code, art 3 l 9(3)(c). 
44 Wojciech Sadurski Freedom of Speech and its Limits (Kluwer Academic Publishers, the 
Netherlands, 1999) 189. 
45 Huscroft, above, 206. 
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exception is based upon an exception to section 319 of the Canadian Criminal Code, 
wilfully promoting hatred.46 
The Canadian Criminal Code makes a further exception for where people 
point out "matters producing or tending to produce feelings of hatred toward an 
identifiable group" "for the purpose of removal" .47 This exception is not included 
within the paper's definition of hate speech, as it would be clear in these cases that 
there was no intention to degrade or denigrate. 
G A Workable Definition 
Drawing on the distinctions made during the above discussion, my definition 
of hate speech follows. 48 
(1) Hate speech is a message which: 
(a) is intended to denigrate or degrade a target group by reason of its 
sex, religious belief, colour, race, ethnic or national origins, disability, 
or sexual orientation; and 
(b) promotes the idea that the target group is inferior. 
(2) Material is not hate speech if: 
(a) it is true; or 
(b) it expresses a religious opinion; or 
(c) it concerns subject of public interest, the discussion of which is for 
the public benefit. 
III REGULATING HATE SPEECH 
Hate speech, as defined in this paper, should be regulated in New Zealand 
because of the harm it causes to its targets and to society in general. The following 
section discusses the harm caused by hate speech and addresses the arguments 
against its regulation. 
46 Canadian Criminal Code, art 3 l 9(3)(a). 
47 Canadian Criminal Code, art 319(3)( d). 
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A Harm Caused by Hate Speech 
1 Harm to targets 
Catherine Lane West-Newman believes that most commentaries on hate 
speech view the harm it causes objectively, as just another legal issue.49 She 
suggests that any analysis of harm must involve a consideration of the targets' story, 
which requires the analyser to feel empathy for the victims of hate speech. 50 This 
paper acknowledges that it is difficult to discuss the harm caused to the targets of 
hate speech without experiencing its effects. However, that does not remove the 
need for this paper to describe the harm caused by hate speech in order to justify its 
regulation. 
I accept the argument that hate speech leads to the subordination of its 
targets, as, according to my definition, hate speech is intended to degrade or 
denigrate members of the target group and promotes the idea that the target group is 
inferior. 51 Kathleen Mahoney argues that the above effects of hate speech create an 
environment where violence or hatred directed at the target group is justified.52 
Many other writers argue that the degrading and subordinating effects of hate speech 
promote discrimination in society and lead to unequal opportunities in the 
workplace, schools, and other public environrnents .53 Hate speech has been linked 
to academic underperformance in its targets .54 Empirical research conducted by 
48 Some guidance for this definition was taken from Jean Francois and Gaudreault DesBiens 
"From Sisyphus's Dilemma to Sisyphus's Duty? A Meditation . on the Regulation of Hate 
Propaganda in Relation to Hate Crimes and Genocide" 46 McGill LJ 1117, 111 8. 
49 Catherine Lane West-Newman "Reading Hate Speech from the Bottom in Aotearoa: 
Subjectivity, Empathy, and Cultural Difference" 9 Waikato LR 231 , 250. 
50 West-Newman, above, 250. 
51 See Kent Greenawalt Fighting Words: Indi viduals, Communities, and Liberties of Speech 
(Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1995) 59-60. 
52 See Kathleen Mahoney "Hate Speech: Affinnation or Contradiction of Freedom of Express ion" 
(1996) U Ill L Rev 789, 792. See also Wojciech Sadurski Freedom of Speech and its Limits 
(Kluwer Academic Publishers, the Netherlands, 1999) 195. 
53 See Larry Alexander "Banning Hate Speech and the Sticks and Stones Defense" (1996) 13 
Const Commentary 71 , 74. See Catherine Lane West- ewman "Reading Hate Speech from the 
Bottom in Aotearoa : Subjectivity, Empathy, and Cultural Difference" 9 Waikato LR 231 , 232. 
See also Richard Delgado "Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and 
Name-Calling" in Critical Race Th eory: th e Cutting Edge (Temple University Press, 
Philadelphia, 1995) 159, 161 for the idea that exposure to hate speech damages the career 
prospects of targets . 
54 J Aronson, OM Quinn , and S J Spencer " Stereotype Threat and the Academic 
Underperfom1ance of Minorities and Women" in J K Swim and C Stanger (eds) Prejudice: the 
Targets Perspective (Academic Press, San Diego, 1998). 
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Laura Beth Nielsen revealed that racist hate speech causes targets to reflect on their 
subordinate status, fear for their safety and at times to engage in violent behaviour.55 
Critical race theorists, such as Mari Matsuda and Richard Delgado, have 
been analysing the harm caused by racial hate speech and discrimination since the 
1980s.56 They argue that hate speech inflicts immediate psychological and physical 
harm upon its targets .57 Hate speech is insulting, and the insult wounds its targets 
causing emotional distress .58 Mari Matsuda explains, "To be hated, despised, and 
alone is the ultimate fear of all human beings". 59 The Supreme Court of Canada in R 
v Keegstra 60 accepted the argument that hate speech was a serious attack on the 
psychological and emotional health of its targets. 61 The potential for videos, which 
promoted the idea that homosexual people were inferior, to cause emotional harm 
was recognised by Thomas J in Living Word. 62 Thomas J described the videos as 
"hurtful" and "oppressive", with the potential to "psychologically scar" or "victimise 
and alienate a sizeable proportion of the population".63 
The targets of hate speech have been said to experience physical reactions to 
the expression including high blood pressure, sleep disturbance, tremors, and 
premature death. 64 Mari Matsuda explains, 65 
55 Laura Beth Nielsen "Subtle, Pervasive, Ham1ful: Racist and Sexist Remarks in Public as Hate 
Speech" (2002) 58 Journal of Social Issues 2, 265, 278. Research conducted was a combination 
of field observation and in-depth interviews. 
56 See Richard Delgado "Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and 
Name-Calling" (1982) 17 Harv CR CLL Rev 133 and Mari Matsuda "Legal Storytelling: Public 
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story" (1989) 87 Mich L.Rev 2320. 
57 For empirical research revealing the psychological harms caused to the targets of anti-
homosexual hate speech see Gregory M Herek "Victim Experiences in Hate Crimes Based on 
Sexual Orientation" (2002) 58 Journal of Social Issues 2,319. 
58 Larry Alexander "Banning Hate Speech and the Sticks and Stones Defense" (1996) 13 Const 
Commentary 71, 73-74. See Robert J Boeckmann and Jeffrey Liew "Hate Speech: Asian 
Americans' Justice Judgments and Psychological Responses" (2002) 58 Journal of Social Issues 
2, 363 for analysis of empirical research relating to the harm of hate speech. 
59 Matsuda, above, 2338. 
60 R v Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697 (Supreme Court of Canada) 
61 R v Keegstra above, 746, Dickson CJ for the majority. 
62 Living Word Distributors v Human Rights Action Group (Living Word) [2000] 3 NZLR 570 
(CA). 
63 Living Word, above, 588 (CA). 
64 Catherine Lane West-Newman "Reading Hate Speech from the Bottom in Aotearoa: 
Subjectivity, Empathy, and Cultural Difference" 9 Waikato LR 231, 250. Richard Delgado 
"Words that Wound : A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling" in Critical 
Race Theory: the Cutting Edge (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1995) 159, 161. 
65 Mari Matsuda "Legal Storytelling: Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's 
Story" ( 1989) 87 Mich L Rev 2320, 2336. 
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The negative effects of hate messages are real and immediate for the victims. 
Victims of vicious hate propaganda have experienced physiological symptoms 
and emotional distress ranging from fear in the gut, rapid pulse rate and 
difficulty in breathing, nightmares, post-traumatic stress disorder, hypertension, 
psychosis, and suicide. 
Because the targets of hate speech are denigrated and degraded they may 
become unconfident, fearful, and withdrawn. 66 Richard Delgado explains that the 
targets of hate speech may begin to believe that the message of inferiority is true; 
questioning their self worth, rejecting their identity, and effectively hating 
themselves. 67 The target may wish to dissociate itself from the negative beliefs held 
about its culture, gender, or sexual orientation as a result of the hate speech. 68 
Targets with reduced self-worth and reduced confidence may react by 
withdrawing from social or political activities, leading to further isolation and 
loneliness. 69 Larry Alexander notes that, because the targets of hate speech often 
withdraw from society, hate speech silences its targets, effectively depriving them of 
their freedom of expression.70 Douglas Wells explains that, if society does not 
regulate hate speech, the message that the expression is justified, or even correct, 
may be communicated to the targets , increasing their humiliation and lack of self 
worth. 71 
Although the harm caused by hate speech can only truly be assessed by 
understanding what it is like to be targeted by it, I accept the arguments that hate 
speech, intende~ to denigrate and degrade members of the target group, 1:1nd which 
promotes the message that the target group is inferior, is harmful to its targets . 
Targets may suffer physical and psychological harm, and may become depressed and 
withdrawn. 
66 Kathleen Mahoney "Hate Speech: Affirmation or Contradiction of Freedom of Expression" 
(1996) U lll L Rev 789, 792. See also Mari Matsuda, above, 2338 . 
67 Richard Delgado, above, 159, 160, 163 . 
68 See Catherine Lane West-Newman "Reading Hate Speech from the Bottom in Aotearoa: 
Subjectivity, Empathy, and Cultural Difference" 9 Waikato LR 231 , 248 . 
69 Mandy Tibbey "Developments in Anti-Vilification Law" (2001) 21 Aust Bar Rev 1, 3. 
70 Larry Alexander "Banning Hate Speech and the Sticks and Stones Defense" (1996) 13 Const 
Commentary 71 , 74. 
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2 Harm to society 
Those who support the regulation of hate speech further argue that society 
itself will suffer if hate speech is permitted, because hate speech undermines core 
democratic values and creates an environment conducive to discrimination and 
violence. 72 Hate speech is detrimental to society because it promotes the message 
that the target group is inferior, which leads to the opinions and contributions of the 
target group being undervalued, causing unequal opportunities and discrimination.73 
More seriously, Jean Francois and Gaudreault DesBiens consider that hate speech is 
a step in the progression towards hate crime, xenophobia, and genocide.74 
Mari Matsuda and Richard Delgado argue that hate speech causes division 
between targets and non-targets. 75 Those who condemn hate speech, but are not 
themselves targeted, feel relief at not being part of the degraded group. Furthermore, 
members of the target group may view all non-members with suspicion. Wojciech 
Sadurski argues that the targets of hate speech may react with violence towards its 
expressers, or towards those not targeted by hate speech generally. 76 
As already discussed, hate speech may silence its targets, causing them to 
withdraw from social or political activities. 77 For this reason, hate speech may 
undermine full participation and debate in society, which has negative ramifications 
for the administration of democracy. 
71 See Douglas Wells "Whose Community? Whose Rights?: Response to Professor Fiss" (1995) 
24 Cap UL Rev 319,321. See also Mari Matsuda "Legal Storytelling: Public Response to Racist 
Speech: Considering the Victim's Story" (1989) 87 Mich L Rev 2320, 2338. 
72 Juliet Moses "Hate Speech: Competing Rights to Freedom of Expression" (1996) 8 Auckland 
U LR no 1, 185, 195 . 
73 See A Regel "Hate Propaganda: A Reason to Limit Freedom of Expression" ( 1984-1985) 49 
Sask Law Rev 303, 308. 
74 Jean Francois and Gaudreault DesBiens "From Sisyphus's Dilemma to Sisyphus's Duty? A 
Meditation on the Regulation of Hate Propaganda in Relation to Hate Crimes and Genocide" 46 
McGillLJ 1117, 1119. 
75 Mari Matsuda "Legal Storytelling: Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's 
Story" (1989) 87 Mich L Rev 2320, 2338-2339. Richard Delgado "Words that Wound: A Tort 
Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling" in Critical Race Theory: the Cutting Edge 
(Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1995) 159, 160. 
76 Wojciech Sadurski Freedom of Speech and its Limits (Kluwer Academic Publishers, the 
Netherlands, 1999) 195. 
77 See Part Ill A l The harm hate speech causes to its targets. Mandy Tibbey "Developments in 
Anti-Vilification Law" (2001) 21 Aust Bar Rev 1, 3. 
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I accept that hate speech may reduce inter-group relations between the 
targeted and the non-targeted, and harm society by promoting the message that the 
target group is inferior, which may lead to increased hostility, discrimination and 
violence. Hate speech may even undermine democracy, by silencing the target 
group. 
B Danger of regulating hate speech 
Regulating hate speech may be appropriate to combat the harm it causes to its 
targets and society generally, but there may be dangers involved in regulating 
expression. The following section addresses the risks involved in regulating hate 
speech. 
1 Importance of freedom of expression 
Those who oppose the regulation of hate speech consider that its regulation 
would threaten freedom of expression, which is the most important democratic and 
human right, upon which all other human rights depend. 78 However, I consider that 
equality is also vital to democracy. A democratic society must be governed by all its 
people, equally. Juliet Moses explains that hate speech is inherently limiting of the 
concept of equality because it causes subordination, degradation, and discrimination 
of a segment of society.79 Equality should not be instantly trumped by freedom of 
expression. Both are important human rights, which must be balanced before either 
is abrogated. 
There are no absolute rights 111 society. Freedom of expression is often 
subject to limitations, including limits placed upon it by the laws of "defamation, 
blasphemy, confidentiality obligations associated with employment, copyright, 
contempt, incitement, official secrecy, sedition and noise pollution" .80 Rights and 
freedoms come with a measure of responsibility. Those exercising freedom of 
78 Juliet Moses "Hate Speech: Competing Rights to Freedom of Expression" ( l 996) 8 Auckland 
U LR 1, 185, 190. 
79 Juliet Moses, above, 190. 
80 Mandy Tibbey, above, 4-5. 
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expression must ensure that they do not infringe upon the rights and freedoms of 
others. 81 
2 Rationales for protecting freedom of express ion 
Those who oppose the regulation of hate speech believe that the benefits of 
allowing free expression outweigh the potential harm caused by hate speech. 82 The 
rationales for protecting expression are considered below. 
(a) The marketplace of ideas 
The first and most persuasive rationale for protecting freedom of expression 
is the marketplace of ideas theory. The theory derives from the writings of John 
Stuart Mill83 and is based upon the dissenting judgment of Holmes J in Abrams v 
United States 84. The theory provides that freedom of expression ensures the 
advancement of knowledge and the discovery of truth. Through freedom of 
expression a marketplace of ideas is created in which there is free trade in 
information from which truth or knowledge may be derived. 85 Free expression 
within the marketplace of ideas is effectively competition; ensuring people can make 
informed decisions by weighing up all points of view. The theory provides that the 
marketplace of ideas would not function as effectively if some of the ideas were 
removed, regardless of how odious they may be. 86 
The marketplace of ideas rationale provides that freedom of expression is 
required for the advancement of knowledge and discovery of truth . However, hate 
speech does not advance society's knowledge but teaches society discrimination, 
hatred, and ignorance. Hate speech is a means of perpetuating falsehoods to the 
81 See Proceedings Commissioner v Archer (1996) 3 HRNZ 123 (CRT) 129, 130. 
82 See Catherine Lane West-Newman "Reading Hate Speech from the Bottom in Aotearoa : 
Subjectivity, Empathy, and Cultural Difference" 9 Waikato LR 231, 236. 
83 
See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Penguin Books, London, 1968). 
84 Abrams v United States, 250 US 66 R 620 (919), Holmes, J ( dissenting). 
85 See Sionaidh Douglas-Scott "The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A Comparison of the 
American and European Approaches" 7 Wm & Mary Bill ofRts J 305, 306. 
86 See Grant Huscroft "Defamation, Racial Dishannony, and Freedom of Expression" in Grant 
Huscroft and Paul Rishworth (eds) Rights and Freedoms: The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993 (Brookcrs, Wellington, 1995) 193 . 
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speaker's gain and the target's detriment. 87 Regulating hate speech according to my 
definition will not adversely threaten the search for truth, as there is an exception 
provided for messages that are true. 
It may be argued that hate speech regulation is paternalistic, undermining 
society's ability to decide for itself which views should prevail. However, it is 
common for the state to intervene into the private sphere in order to do what is best 
for society.88 For example, films that promote the sexual exploitation of children are 
censored in New Zealand, based on the idea that such expression is harmful to 
society. 89 
(b) Democracy and self-government 
The democracy and self-government theory provides that freedom of 
expression is required for democracy to work effectively.90 A self-governing people 
must receive all information that may affect their choices in collective decision 
making. 91 Full participation and debate within a democracy depends upon freedom 
of information and expression.92 
However, democracy and self-government is threatened if we permit hate 
speech. Hate speech undermines democracy by silencing segments of society, and 
discouraging full participation and debate. 93 Hate speech encourages society to 
disregard the views of the target group, which limits their ability to be represented in 
a democracy. 94 Importantly, my definition of hate speech makes an exception for 
messages that concern a matter of public interest, the discussion of which is vital to 
democracy. 
87 See Juliet Moses "Hate Speech: Competing Rights to Freedom of Expression" ( 1996) 8 
Auckland U LR 1, 185, 193. 
88 Moses, above, 193. 
89 Films, Videos, and Publications Act 1993, s 3(2)(a). 
90 R v Kopyto (1987) 47 DLR (41h) 213, 266 Cory J (Ontario Court of Appeal) . 
91 See generally Kathleen Mahoney "Hate Speech: Affim1ation or Contradiction of Freedom of 
Expression" (1996) U lll L Rev 789, 794 . The theory originates from Alexander Meiklejohn, 
Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (Harper, New York, 1948) 104-105 . 
92 Juliet Moses "Hate Speech : Competing Rights to Freedom of Expression" (1996) 8 Auckland 
U LR 1, 185, 191 . 
93 See Part Ill A The Harm Caused by Hate Speech. 
94 See A Regel "Hate Propaganda: A Reason to Limit Freedom of Expression" ( 1984-1985) 49 
Sask Law Rev 303, 308. 
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( c) Tolerance 
Tolerance of others' opinions, no matter how offensive they may be, is said 
to restrain the government from unfairly treating its citizens .95 Freedom of 
expression prevents situations where the state controls ideas. 
However, the tolerance rationale fails to recognise the targets' subjective 
experience. Why should conduct that is inherently harmful be tolerated?96 
Catherine Lane West-Newman argues that tolerance of hate speech is too heavy a 
burden for oppressed groups to bear.97 
(d) Personal fulfilment 
Finally, it is considered that freedom of expression is required so that we can 
have personal fulfilment. 98 This rationale is based upon the idea that "the 
development of human personality and achievement of self-realisation are dependent 
on opportunities to form and communicate beliefs and thoughts to others".99 
The rational of individual fulfilment is also unsatisfactorily applied to hate 
speech . Communicating hate speech does not lead to personal fulfilment or self-
realisation . Hate speech develops a closed mind in its speaker, encouraging bigotry 
and prejudice. Richard Delgado comments that hate speech is self-limiting, and 
denies others' right to develop .100 Moreover, individual fulfilment cannot always be 
facilitated by the state. Juliet Moses explains that , although it may be a form of 
expression to punch someone when they annoy you, the state prohibits that 
expression. 101 
95 See generally Wojciech Sadurski Freedom of Speech and its Limits (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, the Netherlands, 1999) 31. The theory originates from Lee Bollinger The Tolerant 
Society (Oxford University Press, 1988). 
96 Juliet Moses "Hate Speech: Competing Rights to Freedom of Expression" ( 1996) 8 Auckland 
V LR l , 185, 192. 
97 Catherine Lane West-Newman "Reading Hate Speech from the Bottom in Aotearoa: 
Subjectivity, Empathy, and Cultural Difference" 9 Waikato LR 231 , 241. 
98 See Whitney v California (1925) 274 US 357 Brandeis J. 
99 See generally Moses, above, 191. 
100 See Moses, above, 193. 
IOI Moses, above, 193. 
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The arguments for protecting freedom of expression by allowing hate 
speech, rest upon the rationales behind free expression. As explained above, 
regulation of hate speech would not adversely undermine those rationales. 
3 Limiting freedom of expression 
Those who oppose the regulation of hate speech argue that freedom of 
expression is such an important right that it should only be limited in cases where 
allowing the expression would pose an immediate danger to society, and where the 
only way to avert that danger is to suppress the expression. 102 This argument is 
known as the public order test, or the clear and present danger requirement, which 
requires a direct causal link between hate speech and tangible harm. 103 According to 
the public order test, the possibility of indirect harm in the future is not a valid 
reason to undermine freedom of expression. 104 However, the public order test is 
inadequate, as it relies too heavily upon the requirement for tangible harm. It does 
not recognise long-term or psychological harm, or harm to relationships and 
employment prospects. 
Those opposed to regulation of hate speech also contend that its 
offensiveness is not a justification to restrict freedom of expression. 105 This view 
derives from the principle applied in the United Stated called "viewpoint neutrality"; 
that expression should not be restricted just because any listener disagrees with it or 
is offended by it. 106 Viewpoint neutrality has been applied by United States courts to 
protect flag buming107 and anti African-American cross buming108 based on the idea 
that, although the conduct in those cases was wrong, the co~stitutional right to 
freedom of speech should not be undermined just because the state does not agree 
with the views of the expressers. 
102 Nadine Strossen "Liberty and Equality" in Grant Huscroft and Paul Rishworth (eds) Litigating 
Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law (Hart Publishing, Oregan, 2002) 165. 
103 See Wojciech Sadurski Freedom of Speech and its Limits (Kluwer Academic Publishers, the 
Netherlands, 1999) 180. 
104 Strossen, above, 165. 
105 Larry Alexander "Banning Hate Speech and the Sticks and Stones Dcfense" (1996) 13 Const 
Commentary 71, 86. 
106 See S trossen, above, 161. 
107 Texas vlohnson (1989) 491 US 397, 414. 
108 RAV v City of St Paul (1992) 505 US 377. 
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I accept that there are inherent dangers involved in the state regulating 
expression that it considers to be disagreeable, especially if that speech is a 
genuinely held opinion. This danger is tied up with the "slippery slope" argument, 
which provides that, if freedom of expression is limited for hate speech, other similar 
restrictions may follow. 109 Nadine Strossen believes that regulating hate speech may 
have a 'chilling effect' on expression, meaning that people will be deterred from 
making legitimate speech, perhaps even suppressing the expression of the targets of 
hate speech. 110 
However, those dangers may have been overestimated by civil libertarians 
who base their arguments upon the tyranny of states of the past, and are often writing 
from the American perspective, where freedom of expression is an entrenched 
constitutional right. In the New Zealand context, the risk of tyrannical dictatorship 
is not so real. Moreover, the courts of New Zealand accept that freedom of 
expression is not an absolute constitutional right. 111 Freedom of expression may be 
limited where any limitation is demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic 
society. 112 
Those who favour regulation of hate speech believe that the limit placed on 
freedom of expression is justifiable due to its potential harm. Kathleen Mahoney 
argues that hate speech is inherently harmful and should be prevented like any other 
harmful activity, particularly because it is low-value expression with little redeeming 
social value. 113 I favour regulation of hate speech in order to prevent the harms it 
causes. However, any proposed method of regulation must be balanced against 
freedom of expression to ensure that it is a justifiable limitation. 
109 See Grant Huscroft "Defamation, Racial Dishannony, and Freedom of Expression" in Grant 
Huscroft and Paul Rishworth (eds) Rights and Freedoms : The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993 (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 193. See Schauer "Slippery 
Slopes" (1985) 99 Harv LR 361. 
110 Nadine Strossen "Liberty and Equality" in Grant Huscroft and Paul Rishworth (eds) Litigating 
Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law (Hart Publishing, Oregan, 2002) 167. 
111 See generally Grant Huscroft , above, 171 . 
112 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review 
(Moonen) [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 15-16 (CA) Tipping J for the Court. 
11 3 See Kathleen Maloney "Hate Speech: Affirmation or Contradiction of Freedom of 
Expression" (1996) U Ill L Rev 789, 792. "Hate propaganda is not legitimate speech. It is a form 
of harassment and discrimination that should be deterred and punished just like any other 
behaviour that harms people." 
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4 Aggravating the harm caused by hate speech 
Those who oppose the regulation of hate speech sometimes argue that its 
regulation may aggravate its harm. Nadine Strossen argues that the expressers of 
hate speech, if prevented from voicing their opinions, will receive public attention 
and sympathy and may be perceived as martyrs. 114 However, this argument could be 
run in respect to many forms of harmful conduct. Do we legalise mass suicide 
because regulating it may martyr its perpetrators? This risk does not detract from the 
need to show society's intolerance of hateful expression. 
It may also be argued that regulating hate speech will only send the 
expression underground where it cannot be challenged. 115 Does this mean we should 
not regulate hard drugs due to the risk of black market drug industry? The need to 
regulate and prevent the harm caused by hate speech outweighs the risk of it going 
underground. Furthermore, hate speech underground may not have the same 
potential to do harm as it would not reach as wide an audience. 
Nadine Strossen argues that there is little evidence that hate speech 
regulation is effective, or that it deters hate and rehabilitates expressers. 116 Hate 
speech regulation may not deter hateful thought, but it will discourage the spread of 
hateful expression that causes harm to its targets and society. 
It is sometimes argued that allowing hate speech provides an outlet for its 
expressers. 117 To restrict its ·expression may frustrate hate-mongers, forcing them to 
resort to violence. This argument is difficult to assess, and Richard Delgado 
believes there is little evidence to support it. 118 It should be also remembered that 
allowing hate speech to be communicated may in fact promote violence between the 
targeted and the non-targeted. 
114 Nadine Strossen "Liberty and Equality" in Grant Huscroft and Paul Rishworth (eds) Litigating 
Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law (Hart Publishing, Oregan, 2002) 164. 
115 See Strossen, above, 164. 
116 Strossen, above, 162. See generally Catherine Lane West-Newman "Reading Hate Speech 
from the Bottom in Aotearoa: Subjectivity, Empathy, and Cultural Difference" 9 Waikato LR 
231, 237. 
117 See Richard Delgado "Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults , Epithets, and 
Name-Calling" in Critical Race Theory: the Cutting Edge (Temple University Press, 
Philadelphia, 1995) 159, 161. Delgado states that there is little evidence to support this safety 
valve argument. 
118 Delgado, above, 161 . 
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Public funding of education programmes or grants provided to target groups 
to help fight back against hate speech may be effective. 119 Ursula Cheer believes 
that the most appropriate solution to hate speech is counter-speech. 120 The targets of 
hate speech, and other members of society, should use the right to free speech to 
speak out against the expression, a process that is in itself empowering. 121 However, 
the concept of counter-speech fails to recognise that targets may not have the means 
to communicate it, especially if they have been silenced by hate speech. If targets do 
fight back with counter-speech this may just trigger more hateful expression against 
them. 122 Pitting the targeted and non-targeted against each other creates a divided 
society and may lead to conflict and violence. 
Education is an important means to prevent people from forming hateful or 
bigoted opinions. Education and regulation should be combined to maximise 
rehabilitative effect. 
5 Conclusion 
Hate Speech should be regulated in New Zealand to prevent the harms it 
causes. Hate speech regulation will not aggravate the harms caused by hate speech, 
but is the most effective way to combat them. 
C How to Regulate Hate Speech 
After concluding that hate speech should be regulated, the question remains 
of how this should be done. If the main motivator behind hate speech regulation is 
the prevention of the harm it causes, a method of regulation should address and 
minimise that harm. 
11 9 Strossen, above, 167. 
120 Ursula Cheer "Submission to the Select Committee Inquiry into the operation of the Films, 
Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 and related issues" 8. 
121 Strossen, above, 162. 
122 Richard Delgado "Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and ame-
Calling" in Critical Race Theory: the Cutting Edge (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 
1995) 159, 164. 
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I Censorship 
Hate speech may be censored through a classification regune m which 
distribution of material classified as objectionable is an offence. As part of the 
censorship regime, censored publications could be confiscated at a country's 
border. 123 New Zealand has such a classification regime under the Films, Videos, 
and Publications Classification Act 1993. Its ability to censor hate speech is 
discussed below. 124 
Censorship may enable material amounting to hate speech to be banned, 
removing their effect to influence society. However, targets may continue to be 
subjected to hate speech outside the scope of the censorship regime, such as oral 
. 1r speech, and these types of express10n must be addressed through other means. _) 
2 Group defamation 
An action may exist for the targets of hate speech directly against its 
expressers. 126 Such actions are referred to as group defamation. Richard Delgado 
believes targets of hate speech must be given recourse directly against the expresser 
in order to re-empower targets. 127 
The action could be pursuable at tort law, although the more common source 
for a right in group defamation is civil legislation. To use tort law to sue an 
expresser is not a viable option for New Zealand as, although the use of tort to 
regulate hate speech would enjoy flex~bility in the way it was applied by the courts, 
tort law takes time to develop through precedent. Existing torts, such as intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, could not adequately deal with hate speech and new 
precedents applying to hate speech would take time to generate. Moreover, many of 
the targets of hate speech will not have the time, money, or knowledge to apply to 
the ordinary courts for a remedy. 
123 See Canada Customs Tariff 9956, which gives Canada's Customs and Excise Division of the 
Department of Prohibited Importations the power to detain hate speech imported into the country. 
124 See Part IV C Hate Speech and the Films, Videos and Publications Classification Act 1993. 
125 There is no power to classify or censor oral speech under the Films, Videos, and Publications 
Classification Act 1993, s 2. 
126 Richard Delgado "Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-
Calling" in Critical Race Theory: the Cutting Edge (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 
1995) 159, 164. ote that Delgado is referring only to racist hate speech. 
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Legislation may be enacted making communication of hate speech unlawful 
and providing civil or complaints based remedies. This form of recourse would 
provide targets with the ability to complain about hate speech and seek a remedy 
directly from the expresser for the harm caused. Providing complaints mechanisms 
to the targets of hate speech makes it easier for them to fight back against the 
expression. Providing government and industry funded tribunals means targets can 
have better access to justice against hate speech. However, the onus is still upon the 
targets of hate speech to make complaints, which will take time and may require 
legal advice. Targets who have been degraded and dehumanised by hate speech may 
not have the confidence to complain about it. 
3 Criminal legislation 
Hate speech may be prohibited by the criminal law. For example article 137 
of the Netherlands Criminal Code makes it an offence to 'deliberately give public 
expression to views insulting to a group of persons on account of their race, religion 
or conviction or sexual preference'. 128 
Criminal prohibition of hate speech recognises the serious harm it may cause 
and represents society's condemnation of such expression. Criminal prohibition of 
racial hate speech is required under the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All F onns of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). 129 
Criminal legislation shifts the cost and responsibility of punishing hate 
speech upon the state. Standard criminal legislation would not provide direct 
compensation to the individual targets of the hate speech. However, hate speech has 
a negative effect for all members of the target group so it may be unjust for 
complaining members to receive compensation while others cannot. In the situation 
of epithets, or hate speech directed at specific individual targets such as Paul 
Holmes' "cheeky darkie" comment about Kofi Annan, it is possible that legislation 
could provide that an apology or monetary compensation be given to the target by 
the expresser. 
1?7 - Delgado, above, 164. 
128 Netherlands Criminal Code, art 137. 
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Criminal legislation is also in line with overseas approaches. Leading hate 
speech regulators Germany, Canada, and Australia have all enacted and applied 
criminal hate speech legislation. 130 
4 Conclusion 
This paper proposes that the most appropriate way to regulate hate speech, 
and avert the harm it causes, is a mixture of criminal legislation and censorship. 
Making the expression of hate speech, as defined in this paper, a criminal offence is 
likely to deter hate speech more effectively than a group defamation action, which 
may or may not be pursued due to financial or time constraints. It is also important 
to remove hate speech from public circulation so that it cannot continue to promote 
the idea that the target group is inferior. 
Before the precise way in which hate speech should be regulated in ew 
Zealand is considered, this paper explores the ability of current mechanisms in ew 
Zealand to deal with it. 
IV EXISTING MECHANISMS FOR DEALING WITH HATE SPEECH 
A Introduction 
The following section addresses the ability of various existing mechanisms in 
New Zealand to regulate hate speech. Each mechanism is measured against my 
definition of hate speech to see if it adequately covers the expression covered by the 
definition. The definition of hate speech is once more set out below. 
( 1) Hate speech is a message which: 
(a) is intended to denigrate or degrade a target group by reason of its 
sex, religious belief, colour, race, ethnic or national origins, disability, 
or sexual orientation; and 
(b) promotes the idea that the target group is inferior. 
(2) Material is not hate speech if: 
129 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ( 4 January 
1969) 660 UNTS 195, art 4(a). 
130 
German Criminal Code art 130, Canadian Criminal Code art 318-320, Racial Hatred Act 1995 
(Aust Cth). There is also legislation enacted in Australia at state level. 
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( d) it is true; or 
( e) it expresses a religious opinion; or 
(f) it concerns subject of public interest, the discussion of which is for 
the public benefit. 
Each mechanism is considered in terms of the media it applies to; the intent 
required of the expresser; the possible distinguishing features that are included; the 
effect the expression is required to have; and the applicable defences. I will 
conclude on whether each mechanism has the ability to regulate hate speech. 
B Hate Speech and the Human Rights Act 1993 
1 The criminal offence 
(a) Section131 
Section 131 of the Human Rights Act 1993 (HRA) sets out the criminal 
offence of excitement of racial hostility. 131 
131(1) [Offence to incite hostility] Every person commits an offence and is 
liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 
months or to a fine not exceeding $7,000 who, with intent to excite hostility or 
ill-will against, or bring into contempt or ridicule, any group of persons in ew 
Zealand on the ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of that 
group of persons,-
(a) Publishes or distributes written matter which is threatening, abusive, or 
insulting, or broadcasts by means of radio or television words which are 
threatening, abusive, or insulting; or 
(b) Uses in any public place (as defined in section 2(1) of the Summary 
Offences Act 1981 ), or within the hearing of persons in any such public 
place, or at any meeting to which the public are invited or have access, 
words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting,-
being matter or words likely to excite hostility or ill-will against, or bring into 
contempt or ridicule, any such group of persons in New Zealand on the ground 
of the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of that group of persons. 
131 
Human Rights Act 1993, s 131. 
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The criminal prov1s10n originates from section 25 of the repealed Race 
Relations Act 1971, enacted to comply with New Zealand's international obligations 
under the ICERD. 132 
(b) Remedies and resolution 
The penalty for the offence under section 131 is imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 3 months or a fine of up to $7,000. Grant Huscroft has noted that the 
pecuniary penalty is proportionately small when compared to fines in other criminal 
offences. 133 He believes the low level of the fine actually undermines the purpose of 
using of a criminal provision to recognise the seriousness of the offence. 
It should also be noted that the Attorney-General's permission is required for 
prosecution under section 131. 134 This requirement recognises the Attorney-
General's role in ensuring legislation does not infringe rights contained in the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 including the right to freedom of expression. 135 
2 The civil action 
(a) Section 61 
Section 61 of the HRA makes unlawful the excitement of racial hostility. 136 
Section 61 provides, 
61(1) [Inflammatory words] It shall be unlawful for any person-
(a) To publish or distribute137 written matter138 which is threatening, abusive, or 
insulting, or to broadcast by means of radio or television words which are 
threatening, abusive, or insulting; or 
132 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, above, art 
4(a). 
133 Grant Huscroft "Defamation, Racial Disharmony, and Freedom of Expression" in Grant 
Huscroft and Paul Rishworth (eds) Rights and Freedoms: The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 and the Human Rights Act /993 (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 210. 
134 
Human Rights Act 1993, s 132. 
135 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, ss 7, 14. 
136 Section 61 originates from the repealed Race Relations Act 1971, s 9A. 
137 Human Rights Act 1993 s 61 (3) '"Publishes' or 'distributes' means publishes or distributes to 
the public at large or to any member or members of the public". 
138 Human Rights Act 1993, s 61(3) "'Written matter' includes any writing, sign, visible 
representation, or sound recording". 
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(b) To use in any public place as defined in section 2(1) of the Summary Offences 
Act 1981 139, or within the hearing of persons in any such public place, or at any 
meeting to which the public are invited or have access, words which are 
threatening, abusive, or insulting; or 
(c) To use in any place words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting if the 
person using the words knew or ought to have known that the words were 
reasonably likely to be published in a newspaper, magazine, or periodical or 
broadcast by means of radio or television,-
being matter or words likely to excite hostility against or bring into contempt any 
group of persons in or who may be coming to New Zealand on the ground of the 
colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of that group of persons. 
Section 61 (2) provides an exception for the media. It is not unlawful for the 
media to publish or broadcast material that would fall foul of section 61 ( 1 ), if the 
report accurately conveys the intention of the person who expressed the material. 140 
(b) Remedies and resolution 
Complaints about a breach of section 61 may be made to the Human Rights 
Commission. 141 The Human Rights Commission deals with such complaints 
through a dispute resolution process consisting of investigation, mediation, and 
settlement. 142 If the paiiies cannot settle, the matter may go to the Human Rights 
Review Tribunal. 143 In some cases, the Human Rights Review Tribunal will provide 
representation to the claimant at its own cost. 144 Otherwise, cases may be brought in 
person or by a barrister at the claimant's cost, although legal aid may be available. 145 
If the Human Rights Review Tribunal is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that 
139 Summary Offences Act 1981 , s 2( 1 ). "The definition of "public place" means a place that, at 
any material time, is open to the public, whether free or on payment of a charge, and whether any 
owner or occupier of the place is lawfully entitled to exclude or eject any person from that place; 
the definition includes any aircraft, hovercraft, ship, or ferry, or other vessel, train, or vehicle 
carrying or available to carry passengers for reward". 
140 Human Rights Act 1993, s 61(2). 
141 
Human Rights Act 1993, s 76(1)(a). See generally Ursula Cheer "Submission to the Select 
Committee Inquiry into the operation of the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 
1993 and related issues" 9. 
142 
Human Rights Commission "Fact Sheet: What is the Process for Dealing with Disputes" 
<http://www.hrc.co.nz/index.php?p= l 3855&format=text> (last accessed 15 September 2003)> 
143 Human Rights Act 1993 , s 92B. Formerly known as the Complaints Review Tribunal while 
early complaints went to the Equal Opportunities Tribunal. The use of "Tribunal" in this paper 
may be used to refer to all three tribunals. 
144 
Human Rights Act 1993, s 92C(l)(b). 
145 
Human Rights Act 1993, s 92C(l)(a). 
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the defendant has committed a breach of section 61, it may award a number of 
remedies including declaratory relief, a restraining order, or damages. 146 
3 The ability of the HRA to regulate hate speech 
(a) Media 
Neither sections 61 nor 131 of the HRA have the ability to address messages 
communicated through all of the media anticipated in my definition of hate speech. 
The provisions cover expression written, or broadcast by means of radio or 
television, or spoken in public. The provisions may not extend to· expression 
communicated through computer networks, telephone, or fax and do not apply to 
messages communicated through music, film, or video that is not broadcast. Also, 
the provisions may not apply to photographs, art, or symbols. However, the Human 
Rights Commission considers that the display of the swastika, a nazi symbol, is 
likely to contravene both provisions. 147 
(b) Intent 
Similarly to this paper's definition of hate speech, section 131 contains a 
requirement for intent. The offender must intend to "excite hostility or ill-will 
against, or bring into contempt or ridicule, any group of persons" .148 The same 
offence under the repealed Race Relations Act 1971 was criticised because the 
requirement for intent to excite hostility, ill-will, contempt, or ridicule was too 
broad; a low standard which would be more appropriate in defamation law than in 
the criminal law. 149 However, I consider that the requirement for intent in section 
131 is not such a low standard, requiring proof that the offender intended to make 
others feel hostility, ill-will, contempt, or ridicule towards the target group. It is 
different from, and perhaps more onerous than, my definition of hate speech, which 
merely requires that the expresser intends to denigrate or degrade the target group. 
146 
Human Rights Act 1993, s 921. 
147 Human Rights Commission "Race and Ethnic Relations: Infonnation sheet: The Swastika" 
<http: //www.hrc.co.nz/index.php?p=l3824> (last accessed 15 September 2003). 
148 
Human Rights Act 1993, s 131 (I). 
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The civil provision, contained in section 61, does not contain a requirement 
for intent. It is important for the intent of the expresser to be an element in the 
definition of hate speech to avoid situations where legitimate expression 1s 
'b d 150 proscn e . Accordingly, the absence of an intent element in section 61 1s 
unsatisfactory. 
( c) Distinguishing feature 
Sections 61 and 131 only apply to expression aimed at a group's "colour, 
race, or ethnic or national origins". The provisions do not provide for messages that 
excite racial hostility by reason of sex, religious belief, disability, or sexual 
orientation. Accordingly the provisions in the HRA do not adequately meet my 
definition of hate speech. 
(d) Effect 
The expression under section 61 and 131 must have the effect of being 
"threatening, abusive, or insulting". There is no comparable element in my 
definition. This requirement must be subjective, as expression could only be 
threatening or insulting to the targets of the expression. Subjective elements are 
difficult to prove and may be inconsistent, as some people will be more sensitive 
than others and may find material threatening, insulting, or abusive where others 
would not. 151 The Complaints Review Tribunal in Skelton v Sunday-Star Times 152 
commented that, "[t]he views of the very sensitive are not the appropriate yardstick 
by which to measure whether something is insulting" .153 Accordingly, the Tribunal 
must ascertain whether the ordinary sensible citizen would find the material 
threatening, abusive, or insulting. 154 
149 
Keith "the Race Relations Bill" in W A McKean Essays on Race Relations and the Law in 
New Zealand (Sweet and Maxwell, Wellington, 1971). See generally Juliet Moses "Hate Speech: 
Competing Rights to Freedom of Expression" (1996) 8 Auckland U LR 1, 185, 188. 
150 
See Part 11 E 1 Intention. 
151 
See Grant Huscroft "Defamation, Racial Disharmony, and Freedom of Expression" in Grant 
Huscroft and Paul Risbworth (eds) Rights and Freedoms: The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993 (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 204. 
152 
Skelton v Sunday-StarTimes (1996) 3 HRNZ 655 (CRT). 
153 
Skelton v Sunday-StarTimes, above, 660. 
154 
Proceedings Commissioner v Archer (1996) 3 HRNZ 123, 128 (CRT). 
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My definition of hate speech requires that the expression promote the idea 
that the target group is inferior. In contrast, sections 131 and 61 require that the 
expression incite hostility amongst its audience. These effect requirements represent 
the concern that the danger of hateful expression is its ability to influence its 
audience and facilitate the spread of hateful ideas .155 Under section 131 , the 
expression must be "likely to excite hostility or ill-will against, or bring into 
contempt or ridicule, any group of persons" while section 61 does not include ill-will 
or ridicule. As already discussed, incitement is a subjective element which is 
difficult to prove, and the ability for material to excite hostility depends upon the 
potential for its audience to be influenced. 156 In Proceedings Commissioner v 
Archer157 the Tribunal held that a significant number of New Zealanders are not 
perceptive or sensitive to racial issues. 158 Accordingly, the requirement for the 
material to excite racial hostility, relates to the ability for the material to incite 
hostility in those insensitive people. 159 
( e) Defences 
Nether section 131 nor section 61 contain any express defences . Grant 
Huscroft points out that this is particularly problematic in relation to the criminal 
provision. 160 
Criminalization is the most extreme form of legislative response to a 
perceived problem, and as such demands the most stringent justification 
where the exercise of fundamental rights is concerned. The need for 
defences under this section is great. 
Neither provision includes the exceptions contained in my definition, that 
material does not amount to hate speech where it involves a genuine matter of truth, 
religious opinion, or public interest. Grant Huscroft believes the absence of defences 
155 
See Grant Huscroft "Defamation, Racial Disharmony, and Freedom of Expression" in Grant 
Huscroft and Pau l Rishworth (eds) Rights and Freedoms: The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993 (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 205. 
156 
See also Huscroft, above, 205. 
157 
Proceedings Commissioner v Archer (1996) 3 HRNZ 123 (CRT). 
158 Proceedings Commissioner v Archer, above, 128. 
159 
Huscroft, above, 129. 
160 
Huscroft, above, 209. 
39 
in these situations makes the provisions overbroad in application, and is chilling of 
1 . · h 161 eg1t1mate speec . 
However the Tribunal has in practice made exceptions for expression it 
considers to be humorous, or a matter of widespread practice. 162 The Tribunal has 
adopted the test, whether the ordinary sensible citizen would find the material 
humorous. 163 For example, in Neal v Sunday Newspaper Publications Ltd164 the 
Equal Opportunities Tribunal did not uphold a complaint about an article that 
referred to Australians as "our loud-mouthed neighbours across the Tasman". 165 The 
Equal Opportunities Tribunal found that the article was insulting, but because it was 
humorous, it was not likely to excite hostility or ill-will against Australians in New 
Zealand or bring them into contempt or ridicule. 166 As explained earlier, I believe 
humour is best dealt through an intent requirement. 
4 Practical difficulties 
The only reported prosecution under the criminal prov1s1on was decided 
under section 25 of the Race Relations Act 1971 in the case King-Ansell v Police 167 
in which the defendant had been distributing azi propaganda. The Court was 
restricted to considering whether ethnic origin would extend to Jewish people, and 
so gave little guidance on the general application of the criminal provision. 168 Since 
King-Ansell v Police the police have refused to enforce section 131. Considering 
that this provision was passed to comply with the requirement in the ICERD that 
New Zealand criminalise racial hatred, it is inadequate that the provision is not 
enforced. 169 
161 
Huscroft, above, 205-208. Juliet Moses "Hate Speech: Competing Rights to Freedom of 
Expression" ( 1996) 8 Auckland U LR 1, 185, 201. 
162 
See Skelton v Sunday-Star Times (1996) 3 HRNZ 655 (CRT). The Complaints Review 
Tribunal held that the use of the work "Pakeha" with a lower case "p" was common usage and 
would not be likely to excite hostility against European ew Zealanders. 
163 
Proceedings Commissioner v Archer (1996) 3 HRNZ 123 (CRT) 129. 
164 
Neal v Sunday Newspaper Publications Ltd (1985) 5 NZAR 234 (EOT). 
165 
Neal v Sunday Newspaper Publications Ltd, above, 235. 
166 
Neal v Sunday Newspaper Publications Ltd, above, 241. 
167 
King-Ansell v Police [ 1979] 2 NZLR 531 (CA). 
168 
See generally Juliet Moses "Hate Speech: Competing Rights to Freedom of Expression" 
(1996) 8 Auckland U LR 1, 185, 187. 
169 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, ( 4 January 
1969) 660 UNTS 195, art 4(a). 
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According to the Human Rights Commission's Annual Report for the year 
ended 2001, racial hostility accounts for twelve percent of complaints it receives. 170 
Of that twelve percent, over half of the complaints are made by Pakeha New 
Zealanders. 171 The Human Right Commission has noted that complaints under 
section 61 have mostly involved trivial matters such as inappropriate jokes or 
insensitive comments. 172 
5 Conclusion 
The provisions of exciting racial hostility in the HRA do not sufficiently 
regulate hate speech in New Zealand. The provisions do not apply to all media used 
to communicate hate speech and do not address hate speech based on the targets' sex, 
religious belief, disability, or sexual orientation. The provisions are broad and 
ambiguous. The civil provision contains no intent requirement. The provisions 
contain subjective elements, such as the requirement that the expression be 
"insulting" , which are difficult to prove. The requirement that the expression be 
"likely" to excite hostility against or bring into contempt a group of persons is 
ambiguous and broad. These ambiguities, coupled with an absence of defences give 
judges a wide scope to interpret the provision arbitrarily. 
The prov1s10ns do not operate effectively in practice as the criminal 
provision is not enforced, and the Human Rights Commission is swamped with 
trivial complaints under the civil provision. 
C Hate Speech and the Films, Videos, and Public~tions Classification Act 
1993 
1 Objectionable publications 
(a) Section 3(1) 
The Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 (the FVPCA) 
provides for classification of publications , including any film , book, sound 
170 Office of the Race Relations Conciliator "Annual Report for the period ending 1 December 
200 l" <http: //www.hrc.co.nz/hrc/pdfdocs/RR0%20Annual%20Report%202001 .pdf> (last 
accessed 1 October2003) Figure 1, 15. 
171 
Office of the Race Relations Conciliator, above, table 1, 15. 
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recording, picture, newspaper, photograph, any print or writing, and any paper or 
other thing that has a representation shown on it, or information stored on it by 
means of a computer or electronic device. 173 Section 3(1) of the FVPCA sets out a 
general test for where publications may be classified as objectionable. 174 
3. Meaning of" objectionable"- (1 )For the purposes of this Act, a publication 
is objectionable if it describes, depicts, expresses, or otherwise deals 
with matters such as sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence in such a manner 
that the availability of the publication is likely to be injurious to the public good. 
The publication must deal with subject matter that can fairly be described as 
"matters such as sex, honor, crime, cruelty, or violence". 175 The Court in Living 
Word held that material could not be brought within section 3(1) merely because it 
was likely to be injurious to the public good and further held that the words "sex, 
horror, crime, cruelty, or violence" pointed to activity rather than opinion or 
attitude. 176 Secondly, the way the publication deals with the subject matter must 
mean that availability of the publication is likely to result in discernible injury to the 
public good. 177 
(b) Remedies and resolution 
Publications may be submitted to the Office of Film and Literature 
Classification by government censorship organisations, 178 the ew Zealand Customs 
Service, the Police, or members of the public. 179 Where publications are classified 
172 Office of the Race Relations Conciliator, above, 8. 
173 Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993, s 2. 
174 See also the Films, Videos and Publications Classification Act 1993, s 3(2)(a) - (f), which set 
out the circumstances in which a publication will be deemed to be objectionable. 
175 Living Word Distributors v Human Rights Action Group {Living Word) [2000] 3 ZLR 570, 
581 (CA) Richardson P for the majority. The Court of Appeal considered that the expression 
"such as" in section 3(1) is narrower than " includes", which was the term used to define 
"indecent" in the repealed Indecent Publications Act 1963 . 
176 Living Word, above, 581 Richardson P for the majority . The Court of Appeal considered that 
sexual orientation did not come within section 3(1 ). 
177 See Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000) 2 ZLR 9, l l (CA) Tipping J for 
the Court. See also Collector of Customs v Lawrence Publishing Co Ltd [ l 986) 1 NZLR 404, 
408 Woodhouse P (Indecent Publications Tribunal). 
178 The Film and Video Labelling Body and the Censorship Compliance Unit of the Department 
of Internal Affairs. 
179 Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993, ss 12-13. Members of the public 
must have the permission of the Chief Censor. 
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as objectionable it is an offence to posses, make, copy, supply, possess for the 
purposes of supply, distribute, display, advertise or exhibit that publication. 180 
2 Representation of inherent inferiority 
(a) Section 3(3)(e) 
Section 3(3)(e) of the FVPCA requires the censor, when considering whether 
any publication is objectionable, to give weight to the extent to which the publication 
represents that a class of persons are inherently inferior by reason of one of the 
prohibited grounds of discrimination in section 21 (1) of the Human Rights Act 
1993 .181 
(3)In determining, for the purposes of this Act, whether or not any publication (other 
than a publication to which subsection (2) of this section applies) is objectionable or 
should be given a classification other than objectionable, particular weight shall be 
given to the extent and degree to which, and the manner in which, the publication-
(e)Represents (whether directly or by implication) that members of any particular 
class of the public are inherently inferior to other members of the public by reason 
of any characteristic of members of that class, being a characteristic that is a 
prohibited ground of discrimination specified in section 21 ( 1) of the Human Rights 
Act 1993. 
Section 21(1) of the Human Rights Act 1993 sets out the prohibited grounds 
of discrimination. They include sex, marital status, religious belief, ethical belief, 
colour, race, ethnic or national origins, disability, illness, age, politicaf opinion, 
employment status, family status, or sexual orientation. 182 
The operation of section 3(3)(e) was considered by the Court of Appeal in 
Living Word. The Court of Appeal held that weight could be given to the extent to 
which a publication represented that a class of persons was inherently inferior, but 
only if that publication also dealt with "matters such as sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or 
18° Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993, ss 123, 124, and 13 . The penalty is a 
fine, which ranges from $2,000 to $50,000 depending on whether the offender has knowledge 
that the publication is objectionable and whether the offender is a body corporate. 
181 The weighting factors do not apply to publications deemed objectionable under the Films, 
Videos, and Publications Classification Act, s 3(2) 
182 See Human Rights Act 1993, s 21 ( 1) for the full list of prohibited grounds of discrimination. 
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violence". 183 For example, in a mildly pornographic video presenting the view that 
Jewish people are dishonest, greedy, and dirty, the extent to which the video 
represents Jews as inferior may weigh in favour of censorship under the FVPCA. 
However, in a documentary style video containing the same message about Jews 
without any sexual content, the extent to which the video presented Jews as inferior 
would not be considered, regardless of the potential harm of such a publication. 
(b) Living Word 
The Court of Appeal in Living Word interpreted the FVPCA in the discussed 
way in order to overrule a decision of the Board of Review that the videos were 
objectionable. The following section considers whether the Court of Appeal reached 
the correct result, by considering whether the videos would constitute hate speech 
for the purposes of this paper. 
Living Word concerned the ability of two videos to be censored under the 
FVPCA, one of which opposed the pursuit of equal rights by gay, lesbian, bisexual 
and transgender people, while the other presented the view that homosexuality was 
the cause of HIV and AIDS. 184 
The medium used to communicate the message in Living Word would satisfy 
my definition of hate speech. The message was communicated through video. The 
target group of the message was homosexual people by reason of their sexual 
orientation. 
The issue of whether the videos were intended to denigrate or degrade 
homosexual people by reason of their sexual orientation is more difficult. Thomas J 
in his dissenting judgment in Living Word commented, "both videos reveal an 
abhorrence of what is called the 'homosexual lifestyle'" .185 The videos strongly 
communicate the message that the homosexual lifestyle is wrong while the 
183 Living Word Distributors v Human Rights Action Group (Living Word) [2000] 3 NZLR 570, 
582 (CA) Richardson P for the majority. 
184 See Ursula Cheer "More Censorship, Discrimination and Bill of Rights" (2000) Dec NZLJ 
472. The Film and Video Labelling Body labelled the videos as restricted to persons over 16, The 
Classification Office classified the videos as Rl 8, the Board of Review classified the videos as 
objectionable, and the full court of the High Court upheld the Board's decision. 
185 Living Word, above, 588 Richardson P for the majority. 
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heterosexual lifestyle is right. 186 The A!Ds: What You Haven't Been Told1 87 video 
set out to prove that, what it considered to be the sexually promiscuous and deviant 
lifestyle of homosexual people, is responsible for the spread of AIDs . A quote form 
the transcript of the video follows, 188 
Many concerned citizens and celebrities, anxious to lend their support to the fi ght 
against AIDS, unwittingly are endorsing the homosexual agenda, which demands 
the legalisation and acceptance of all kinds of deviant sexual behaviour; including 
prostitution and sadomasochism." 
AIDs: What You Haven't Been Told communicated the message that 
homosexuals were deviant, dirty, and the spreaders of disease. It is likely that the 
expressers of this message intended to degrade homosexual people through it. The 
purpose of the Gay Rights/Special Rights: Inside the Homosexual Agenda 189 video 
was to encourage its audience to oppose the pursuit of equal rights by homosexual 
people. 190 It was obviously intended to degrade homosexual people because its 
argument was that homosexual people are not equal. A reasonable person would 
consider that both videos intended to denigrate and degrade homosexual people. 
Further because the homosexual lifestyle is presented as inherently wrong 
and dangerous, and homosexual peoples' quest for equal rights is opposed through 
the videos, the videos have the effect of promoting the idea that homosexual people 
are inferior. Prima facie, the videos meet my definition of hate speech. 
( c) Religious expression 
My definition provides certain exceptions to hate speech, including an 
exception for the expression a religious opinion. Arguably, the Living Word videos 
are the expression of a religious opinion. It is based upon the ideas of Christianity 
186 Jeremiah Films "Aids: What You Haven't Been Told" video transcript <http ://www.christian-
apologetics .org/html/Aids .htm> (last accessed 1 September 2003 ). Jeremiah Films "Gay 
Rights / Special Rights : Ins ide the Homosexual Agenda" <http ://www .christian-
a~ologetics.org/html/Gay_rights_ Special_rights.htm> (last accessed 1 September 2003). 
1 7 Jeremiah Films "Aids: What You Haven't Been Told" , above. 
188 Jeremiah Films "Aids: What You Haven't Been Told" , above. 
189 Jeremiah Films "Gay Rights/Special Rights: Inside the Homosexual Agenda", above. 
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that the videos promote the idea that homosexuality is wrong and homosexual people 
are inferior. But is the idea that homosexuals cause AIDs, or the idea that 
homosexuals should not enjoy equal rights, based on Christianity? A definition of 
hate speech should not allow expressers to easily justify their conduct in the name of 
religion, if they may have other more sinister reasons for the expression. Both Hitler 
and the Ku Klu Klan have justified their conduct in the name of Christianity. 
However, the videos were religious publications, produced by a Christian 
organisation to be distributed within the Christian community. 191 They may have 
involved other political or social objects, but overall they were religious expression. 
Accordingly the videos were not hate speech. Thomas J explains, "[t]he videotapes 
portray the beliefs and prejudices of religious fundamentalism". 192 
The Court of Appeal in Living Word reached the correct result by not 
classifying the videos as objectionable, however, it reached that result based upon 
the wrong reasoning. One gets the impression, from the judgment, that the Court of 
Appeal intuitively felt that the videos should not be censored, perhaps because it 
considered that the videos were merely religious, moral, or political opinions, but 
there was no available exception within section 3(3)(e). This appears to be the point 
the Court was getting at when it stated that the words "sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or 
violence" pointed to activity rather than opinion or attitude. 193 
To avoid taking into account the fact that the videos represent homosexual 
people as inherently inferior, the Court of Appeal held that there was no jurisdiction 
to classify the videos. The Court stated that sexual orientation would not come 
within "matters such as sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence" . 
The Court ' s reasoning may not have been appropriate. In Re "Exposing the 
Aids Scandaf "194 the Indecent Publications Tribunal held that sexual orientation and 
sexual health could come within the gateway in the repealed Indecent Publications 
190 Jeremiah Films "Gay Rights/Special Rights: Inside the Homosexual Agenda", 
above. 
191 See Haley Walls "Gay Rights/Special Rights, Inside the Homosexual Agenda": the Demise of 
Section 3(3)(e) of the films , videos , and publications Classification Act 1993" (LLB(Hons) 
Research Papar, Victoria University of Wellington, 2000) 5. 
192 Living Word Distributors v Human Rights Action Group (Living Word) [2000] 3 ZLR 570, 
588 (CA) Thomas J dissenting. 
193 Living Word, above, 58 l Richardson P for the majority. 
194 Re "Exposing the Aids Scandal" l HRNZ 170, l 82 (Indecent Publications Tribunal) 
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Act 1963 "matters including sex, horror, crime, cruelty of violence". "Including" 
may be a slightly broader concept than "such as", however, the Tribunal held that 
there was jurisdiction to censor the book merely because it was injurious to the 
public good. 195 The Living Word videos also dealt with sexual orientation and 
sexual health. They similarly should have been held to come within "matters such as 
sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence". Importantly, when the FVPCA was passed 
the legislature did not intend that section 3(1) would admit only "sex, horror, crime, 
cruelty, or violence" to be considered under it. 196 
The strict interpretation of "matters such as sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or 
violence" by the Court of Appeal has created side effects. The Select Committee 
Inquiry into the Operation of the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 
1993 and Related Issues 197 expressed concern that, as a result of the Living Word 
decision, the classification office has no jurisdiction to consider matters such as 
nudity or offensive language. 198 
I believe that the Court of Appeal reached its result partly because there was 
no exception to section 3(3 )( e) for religious expression. To ban the videos would be 
the incorrect result according to my definition of h speech. To avoid banning the 
videos, the Court of Appeal interpreted sections 3(1) and 3(3)(e) in a considerably 
narrow way. 
3 The ability of the FVPCA to regulate hate speech 
(a) Media 
Section 3(3)(e) applies to express10n communicated through publications, 
including any film, book, sound recording, picture, newspaper, photograph, any print 
195 See also Customs v Lawrence Publishing Co Ltd [ 1986] I NZLR 404, 410 (Indecent 
Publications Tribunal) . Woodhouse P stated that the definition of indecency in the Indecent 
Publications Act 1963 included things other than matters of "sex, horror, crime, cruelty and 
violence", but that those other things had to be injurious to the public good in order to be banned. 
But see Living Word, above, 581 Richardson P for the Majority. The Court of Appeal held that 
"such as" is narrower than "includes". 
196 See Department of Justice Report to Internal Affairs and Local Government Select Committee 
of the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Bill (Wellington 1993) DJ/3, 7. 197 Government Administration Select Committee "Inquiry into the operation of the Films, 
Videos, and Publications Classifications Bill" (March 2003). 
198 Government Administration Select Committee "Inquiry into the operation of the Films, 
Videos, and Publications Classifications Bill" (March 2003) 23 
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or writing, and any paper or other thing that has a representation shown on it, or 
information stored on it by means of a computer or electronic device. 199 The 
provision does not address expression spoken in public places, or broadcast on 
television or radio as provided for under my definition of hate speech. 
(b) Intent 
Section 3(3)(e) does not require that the expresser intend to denigrate or 
degrade the target class. This means that, according to section 3(3)(e), weight could 
be given to the extent to which a publication represented that a target group were 
inherently inferior regardless of whether the expresser intended it to have that effect. 
The absence of an intent requirement is inadequate according to my definition of 
hate speech, and gives section 3(3)(e) considerable breadth. 
( c) Distinguishing feature 
Under section 3(3)(e), the message may relate to a large number of possible 
distinguishing features of the target group. The possible features include all of the 
distinguishing features in my definition of hate speech. However, they also extend 
to further features such as marital status, age, employment status, and family 
status.200 These features extend the potential application of section 3(3)(e) to 
distinguishing features not commonly denigrated by hate speech. For example, 
pursuant section 3(3)(e), weight could be given to the extent to which a publication 
represented that married people are inherently inferior. 
(d) Effect 
Section 3(3)(e) addresses express10n that represents that members of any 
particular class of the public are inherently inferior to other members of the public. 
This requirement is similar to the requirement in my definition that the expression 
must promote the message that the target group is inferior. However, the 
requirement in section 3(3)(e) is merely that the publication represents people in a 
particular way, and does not require the publication to have any effect on its 
audience. This standard is lower than my definition, which requires the message to 
199 Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993, s 2. 
200 Human Rights Act 1993 , s 21 (I). 
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have some possible effect on its audience by promoting or encouraging the idea that 
the target group is inferior. 
( e) Defences 
There are no express exceptions to the broad requirement set out in section 
3(3)(e). In Living Word the absence of an exception for religious expression caused 
difficulty. Further cases are likely to arise where the absence of a defence for truth, 
or matters in the public interest cause difficulty. 
4 Conclusion 
Section 3(3)(e) of the FVPCA does not adequately regulate hate speech as 
defined in this paper. The FVPCA cannot be used to censor expression 
communicated through all of the media within the definition. Secondly, section 
3 (3 )( e) is too broad. As discussed, the test for representing a class as inherently 
inferior is relatively easily met. Section 3(3)(e) extends the number of 
distinguishing features to far, may be satisfied regardless of the expresser's intent, 
and does not require the expression to have any active influence on its audience . 
Due to the absence of defences in such a broad provision it is not surprising 
that the Court of Appeal decided to interpret the FVPCA so narrowly. However, the 
interpretation of the Court of Appeal in Living Word has made section 3(3)(e) almost 
redundant. The extent to which a publication represents that a class of society is 
inherently inferior can only be taken into account by the censor' where "sex, horror, 
crime, cruelty, or vio lence" accompany it. 
Further, section 3(3)(e) is only a weighting factor and is not a separate 
ground for censorship.201 The censor may use its discretion to apply or not apply the 
prov1s10n. 
The Select Committee Inquiry has recommended that section 3(1) require 
simply that the availability of the publication be likely to be injurious to the public 
201 Living Word, above, 582. 
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good. 202 This would mean section 3(3)(e) could be a weighting factor regardless of 
whether the publication dealt with "sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence". 
However, this proposal would not solve the problems of the breadth and inadequacy 
of section 3(3)(e) itself, or the inadequacy of section 3(3)(e) being merely a 
weighting factor to be applied at the censor's discretion. lf the Committee believed 
that the extent to which publications represent people as inherently inferior was an 
important concern, it should have recommended an alternative to section 3(3)(e). 
Such an issue did not enter into the Select Committees short discussion of hate 
speech. 
Similarly a private members Bill currently before the house proposes to 
amend section 3(1) to provide "matters including, but not limited to sex ... "203 
Likewise the amendment, proposed by Marc Alexander, will not improve the ability 
to censor hate speech under the FVPCA. 
D HATE SPEECH AND THE BROADCASTING ACT 1989 
I The Broadcasting Standards Authority 
(a) The denigration and discrimination principle 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA) is responsible for encouraging 
the development and observance by broadcasters of Codes of Broadcasting Practice 
(Codes) in relation to a number of factors including in section 21(l)(e)(iv), 
Safeguards against the portrayal of persons in programmes in a manner that 
encourages denigration of, or discrimination against, sections of the community 
on account of sex, race, age, disability, or occupational status or as a 
consequence of legitimate expression of religious, cultural, or political beliefs: 
202 Government Administration Select Committee "Inquiry into the operation of the Films, 
Videos, and Publications Classifications Bill" (March 2003) 24 
203 the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification (Meaning of Objectionable) Amendment 
Bill, no 21-1 
The Free to Air Television Code of Broadcasting Practice (Free to Air 
Code/04, the Radio Code of Broadcasting Practice (Radio Code), 205 and the 
Subscription Television Code of Broadcasting Practice (Subscription Code),206 all 
contain a principle that seeks to safeguard against the concern expressed in section 
21(1)(e)(iv) .207 Principle 7(a) of the Radio Code follows .208 
Broadcasters will not portray people in a manner which encourages denigration 
of or discrimination against any section of the community on account of 
gender, race, age, disability, occupational status, sexual orientation; or as the 
consequence of legitimate expression of religious, cultural or political beliefs. 
This requirement does not extend to prevent the broadcast of material which is: 
i) factual ; or 
ii) a genuine expression of serious comment, analysis or opinion, or 
iii) is by way of legitimate humour or satire. 
There are a few differences in the denigration principles of the three codes. 
The two television Codes merely require that broadcasters "should avoid" portraying 
persons in the specified manner rather than stating that broadcasters "will not" 
portray persons in the specified manner. 209 Both television Codes also provide an 
·additional exception for material in the legitimate context of a dramatic work. 210 
The Subscription Code is worded differently from the other two Codes in that it 
requires that broadcasters "avoid portraying people in a way which represents them 
as inherently inferior, or is likely to encourage discrimination against, any section of 
the community".211 
204 "Free to Air Television Code of Broadcasting Practice" <http://www.bsa.govt.nz/g-
bsacod.htrn> (last accessed 30 September 2003). 
205 "Radio Code of Broadcasting Practice " <http ://www.bsa.govt.nz/r-bsacod.htrn> (last accessed 
30 September 2003). 
206 "Subscription Television code of Broadcasting Practice" <http ://www.bsa .govt .nz/p-
bsacod.htm> (last accessed 30 September 2003). 
207 The principles are collectively referred to in this paper as "the denigration principle". 
208 "Radio Code of Broadcasting Practice", above, 7(a). 
209 "Subscription Television code of Broadcasting Practice", above, 12. "Free to Air Television 
Code of Broadcasting Practice", above, 6g. 
210 "Subscription Television code of Broadcasting Practice", above, 12(iii). "Free to Air 
Television Code of Broadcasting Practice", above, 6g(iii). 
211 "Subscription Television code of Broadcasting Practice", above, 12. 
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(b) Remedies and resolution 
Failure to comply with the Codes may not be dealt with by a civil action in 
the ordinary courts.212 Where members of the public believe that the denigration 
principle has been breached by a television or radio programme, they may complain 
in the first instance to the broadcaster, and if dissatisfied with the outcome of that 
complaint, to the BSA. 21 3 
If the BSA decides that the complaint is justified, in whole or in part, it may 
order the broadcaster to publish a statement which relates to the complaint,214 order 
the broadcaster to refrain from broadcasting for a period not exceeding 24 hours, 215 
or refer the complaint back to the broadcaster.216 The BSA may also order the 
broadcaster to pay costs of the proceedings to the Crown or to the complaining 
party.21 7 Failure to comply with an order of the BSA is an offence subject to a fine 
of up to $100,000.218 
2 The ability of the Broadcasting Act 1989 to regulate hate speech 
(a) Media 
The BSA has jurisdiction only to consider expression made through 
television or radio. 219 It has no power to regulate expression made through other 
media which would be caught my definition of hate speech, such as messages 
spohn in public, written material , or messages communicated through computer 
networks, telephone, or fax; or communicated though music , film, video , 
photograph, art, or symbols. 
2 12 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 4(3) . 
2 13 See Broadcasting Act 1989, ss S(b), S(d), 21(1)(a) . See also Broadcasting Act 1989, s 18. 
There is a further right of appeal to the High Court. 
2 14 Broadcasting Act 1989, s l3(1)(a). 
2 15 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 13(1)(b)(i) . 
216 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 13(1)(c). 
2 17 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 16(4) 16(1). 
2 18 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 14. 
2 19 The BSA has jurisdiction over broadcasts. The BSA docs not consider "Broadcasts" to cover 
the Internet under the Broadcasting Act 1989. 
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(b) Intent 
There is no requirement for intent in the denigration principle. I believe it is 
important for the intent of the expresser to be an element in the definition of hate 
speech, to restrict the application of regulation. Accordingly, the absence of an 
intent element in the denigration principle is unsatisfactory. 
( c) Distinguishing feature 
The denigration principle relates to denigration of, or discrimination against, 
sections of the community based on "sex, sexual orientation, race, age, disability, or 
occupational status" and "legitimate expression of religious, cultural or political 
beliefs". The grounds include all of the distinguishing features contained in my 
definition of hate speech except "colour" and "ethnic or national origins", however, 
those grounds may be implied within "race". But the Codes also include as grounds 
"age", "occupational status" and cultural or political beliefs, which are not included 
in my definition and give the provision wider application. The grounds included 
within the denigration principle seem to be a simple reiteration of the prohibited 
grounds of discrimination. 220 
(d) Effect 
The Radio Code and Free to Air Code, contain an objective requirement that 
the broadcaster encourage denigration of, or discrimination against, the target group, 
which is similar to the requirement in my definition that the message must promote 
the idea that the target group is inferior. 221 It is likely that any message which has 
the effect of encouraging the denigration of, or discrimination against, sections of the 
community would also have the effect of promoting the idea that the target group is 
inferior. 
However, the effect requirement in the Subscription Code is, "portraying 
people in a way which represents as inherently inferior, or is likely to encourage 
220 Human Rights Act 1993, s 21(1). See Part III D Distinguishing feature . 
22 1 "Radio Code of Broadcasting Practice " <http: //www.bsa.govt.nz/r-bsacod.htm> (last accessed 
30 September 2003) 7(a) . "Free to Air Television Code of Broadcasting Practice" 
<http ://www.bsa.govt.nz/g-bsacod .htm> (last accessed 30 September 2003) 6g. 
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discrimination against, any section of the community".222 The denigration provision 
in the Subscription Code is of a lesser standard than the other Codes, and also of my 
definition of hate speech, because the portrayal must only be "likely" to encourage 
discrimination.223 Moreover, the Subscription Code accepts another possible effect, 
that the portrayal represents a section of the community as inherently inferior.224 
This effect requirement is similar to my definition of hate speech. However, the 
principle only requires that the portrayal "represent" the section as inferior, which 
may be a lower and broader standard than the requirement in my definition, that the 
message actually "promote" the idea that the group is inferior. 
(e) Exceptions 
The exception in the denigration principle for factual material is similar to 
the exceptions in my definition of hate speech for messages that are true. Truth can 
genuinely be established by fact. This exception is an important exception for the 
broad principle. 
The denigration principle makes an exception for a humorous, satirical, and 
in the case of television dramatic, work. For example, in Sylvia Shepherd v Th e 
Radio Network Ltd225 The Broadcasting Standards Authority considered a complaint 
about a radio broadcast which contained jokes about the plight of the French during 
World War Two. The Authority declined to uphold the complaint, finding that the 
broadcast was populist and humorous , thereby falling within the exception for 
"dramatic, humorous or satirical work" . I do not accept that exceptions to hate 
speech should be made in the name of humour, satire, or drama because hateful 
messages may be spread in the guise of humour. In many cases an expresser 
combines humour with an intent to degrade or denigrate. A neo-nazi may find it 
humorous to make jokes about "niggers". Humour is better dealt with, as in the 
paper's definition, by an intent requirement. Expression that was purely intended to 
222 "Subscription Television .code of Broadcasting Practi ce" <http ://www .bsa .govt.nz/p-
bsacod.htm> (last accessed 30 September 2003) 12. 
223 See John Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media Law in New Zealand (4 ed, Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1999) 447. 
224 "Subscription Television code of Broadcasting Practice", above, 12. 
225 Sylvia Sh epherd v The Radio Network Ltd ( l 5 May 2003) Broadcasting Standards Authority 
2003-037 <http: //www.bsa.govt .nz/data/2003/2003-037 .html> (last accessed 30 September 
2003). 
be humorous, and was not intended to denigrate or degrade would not amount to 
hate speech according to my definition . 
Finally, the denigration principle also contains an exception for the 
communication of opinion. In Stephen Cotterall v The Radioworks Ltd226 the BSA 
declined to uphold a complaint relating to a statement that "Maori is not a culture" 
because it was a statement of the radio host's opinion. This exception is perhaps too 
wide, as many opinions may be hateful and harmful. In contrast, my definition 
makes an exception for religious opinion, while important political opinion may be 
covered by the exception for expression on subjects in the public interest, the 
discussion of which is for the public benefit. 
3 The denigration provision in practice 
Perhaps due to the breadth of the denigration provisions and the absence of a 
requirement for intent, the BSA has set a high threshold to be met before a broadcast 
contravenes the denigration provision. The BSA requires what it calls a "high level 
of denigration" in the sense of "blackening" of the reputation of the group. 227 
However, the BSA tends to make a decision without explaining how or why that 
standard is met. 228 
Ursula Cheer and John Burrows point out that even where the BSA finds that 
standards have been breached, it will often not impose an order, especially if the 
complaint appears trivial, or if it is the first complaint against the broadcaster. Even 
if the BSA does decide to make an order, the complainant is not given an adequate 
remedy. Financial compensation is at most an award of costs and it is more common 
for complainants to receive an apology. Further, the broadcaster is not punished 
seriously for an upheld complaint. Publication of the BSA's decision and payment 
of court costs is not likely to be a serious deterrent for broadcasters. 
226 Steph en Cotterall v Th e Radioworks Ltd (14 February 2000) Broadcasting Standards 
Authority 2000-015 <http: //www .bsa .govt.nz/data/2000/2000-015 .html> (last accessed 30 
September 2003). 
227 Credo Society Inc v 95 bFM (13 February 1997) Broadcasting Standards Authority 1997-008 
:::http ://www.bsa.govt.nz/data/1997 / 1997-008.html> (last accessed 30 September 2003). 
228 In Credo Society Inc v 95 bFM, above, calling a mayor and councillors "arseholes" did not 
meet the test. 
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4 Conclusion 
The complaints mechanism provided for under the Broadcasting Act 1989 
has minimal ability to deal with hate speech as defined in this paper. The BSA can 
only consider expression made through television or radio. The denigration 
principle is worded broadly. It contains is no requirement for intent, contains many 
grounds, and in relation to subscription television, is broad in the effect it requires 
the expression to have. Due to the breadth of the principle, the BSA has arbitrarily 
imposed a high standard before the principle is applied. Finally, the BSA does not 
provide an adequate remedy to complainants. 
E HATE SPEECH AND THE PRESS COUNCIL 
I The New Zealand Press Council 
(a) The discrimination principle 
The New Zealand Press Council (the Press Council) is a privately funded 
voluntary organisation that provides the public with an independent forum for 
resolution of complaints against the press about the editorial content of newspapers, 
magazines or periodicals published in New Zealand (including their websites).229 
The Press Council sets out a number of ethical principles to be complied with by the 
press. Principle 8, entitled "discrimination" , provides,230 
Publications should not place gratuitous emphasis on gender, religion, 
minority groups, sexual orientation, age, race, colour or physical or mental 
disability. Nevertheless, where it is relevant and in the public interest, 
publications may report and express opinions in these areas 
229 New Zealand Press Council <http: //www.presscouncil.org.nz/> (last accessed 19 September 
2003). 
230 New Zealand Press Council <http ://www.presscouncil.org.nz/principles> (last accessed 19 
September 2003). 
(b) Remedies and resolution 
If a member of the public believes that a publication is in breach of principle 8, 
the complainant must first seek redress with the publication concemed.231 If the 
outcome of the complaint to the publication is unsatisfactory, it may be referred to 
the Press Council. 232 
If the Press Council finds that the publication has breached a principle it may 
require the offending publication to publish the essence of any decision which goes 
against that newspaper or magazine, giving it fair prominence, although it has no 
power to enforce this sanction. lt cannot seek monetary recompense for 
complainants. 233 
1 Ability of the Press Council to regulate hate speech 
(a) Media 
The Press Council accepts complaints about published articles , pictures, 
cartoons, advertisments, and billboards.234 However, the Press Council may only 
regulate expression communicated in newspapers, magazines, and periodicals . It 
cannot consider messages spoken in public, written in books or academic articles, 
communicated through computer networks , telephone, or fax, broadcast on 
television or radio or communicated though music, film, video, photograph, art, or 
symbols. 
(b) Intent 
There is no requirement 111 principle 8 that the author of the offending 
publication intend to "denigrate or degrade a target group" . 
23 1 See John Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media Law in New Zealand (4 ed, Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1999) 453 . 
232 John Burrows and Ursula Cheer, above, 453 . 
233 New Zealand Press Council <http ://www.presscouncil.org.nz/> (last accessed 19 September 
2003). 
234 John Burrows and Ursula Cheer, above, 453 . 
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( c) Distinguishing feature 
Publications must not place gratuitous emphasis on "gender, religion, minority 
groups, sexual orientation, age, race, colour or physical or mental disability". 
Principle 8 includes all of the grounds contained in my definition of hate speech 
except for ethnic or national origins. Ethnic or national origins are likely to be 
implied within race or colour. Principle 8 also includes minority status and age. 
These provisions are not included within my definition of hate speech. 
(d) Effect 
Although the principle is entitled "discrimination" it fails to mention the 
required effect of the expression. The principle does not require that the publication 
"promote the message that the target group is inferior". The inclusion of a 
promoting effect is important because the harm of hate speech is related to its ability 
to disseminate hateful ideas. Principle 8 merely states that the publication must not 
place gratuitous emphasis on characteristics of the target class. 
( e) Defences 
To aggravate the breadth of the discrimination principle, there are no express 
defences for truth, religious opinion, or public interest. However, the Press Council 
applies a defence for humour in practice. For example, in Roehl v The Dominion 
Post!35 the Press Council considered a complaint about an article which criticised 
. . 
Winston Peters' anti-Asian immigration stance, and stated that Peters might as well 
blame homosexuality for reducing the population of ew Zealand. The Press 
Council did not uphold the complaint on the basis that it was humorous stating, 
"From the first eye-catching sentence to the end, the column was unquestionably 
written in a heavily satirical style and was not intended to be taken literally."236 
Whether expression is humorous is not a consideration in my definition of 
hate speech. There will be instances of hate speech where the expresser intends to 
denigrate or degrade the target group while portraying the message as humour. The 
235 Roehl v The Dominion Post (February 2003) Press Council 915 
<http://www.presscouncil.org.nz/> (last accessed 28 September 2003). 
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focus should instead be on the effect of the expression. If the expression has the 
effect of promoting the message that the target group is inferior it is irrelevant 
whether the expression adopts a humorous tone. As discussed earlier, humorous 
messages will nor come within my definition of hate speech if they are not intended 
to denigrate or degrade.237 
4 The discrimination principle in practice 
Few complaints are made to the Press Council. According to John Burrows 
and Ursula Cheer the Press Council receives around 80 complaints a year and of 
those only around a half come to adjudication. 238 Of those adjudicated, around one 
seventh are upheld in whole or in part.239 Obviously, the discrimination principle is 
not often used to prevent discriminatory expression by the press. The Press Council 
places a limitation period of three months after publication in which it will accept 
complaints. 240 This short limitation period may explain the low number of 
complaints received. 
It is also important to note that the Press Council requires complainants to 
give a written undertaking that, having referred the matter to the Press Council, they 
will not take or continue proceedings against the publication or journalist 
concemed.241 This approach is based on the idea that the Press Council should not 
be a trial run for litigation.242 This requirement is unsatisfactory, as those who 
complain to the Press Council will not receive an effective remedy, which they may 
have been able to seek in other forums. 
236 Roehl v The Dominion Post, above. 
237 See Part II E 1 Intention. 
238 John Burrows and Ursula Cheer, above, 453 . 
239 John Burrows and Ursula Cheer, above, 453. 
240 New Zealand Press Council <http ://www.presscouncil.org.nz/complain.htm> (last accessed 
19 September 2003). 
241 New Zealand Press Council <http ://www.presscouncil.org.nz/complain.htm> (last accessed 
19 September 2003). 
242 New Zealand Press Council <http ://www.presscouncil.org.nz/complain.htm> (last accessed 
19 September 2003). 
5 Conclusion 
The Press Council does not effectively regulate hate speech in New Zealand. 
It may only consider print media, and applies a very broadly worded principle , 
which is subject to the discretion of Council members in its application. There is no 
requirement that the author of the publication intended to denigrate or degrade the 
target group, and no requirement that the publication promotes the message that the 
target group is inferior. The complaints mechanism run by the Press Council has no 
"teeth", as it fails to provide complainants with an effective remedy. 
V RECOMMENDATIONS 
A The Ability for Hate Speech to be Regulated in New Zealand 
1 Gaps in the law 
This paper has explained the harm caused by hate speech, and has 
recommended that it be regulated in New Zealand. Further, this paper has 
demonstrated the inability of current legal mechanisms to regulate hate speech. 
Each mechanism applies to different media, while some of the media 
covered overlap between mechanisms. For example, complaints about television or 
radio broadcasts may be made to the BSA and the Human Rights Review Tribunal. 
The current mechanisms are limited in the distinguishing features the 
denigration or degradation may be based upon. The HRA is only concerned with 
colour, race, or ethnic or national origins, and may not be used to regulate expression 
based on the targets' sex, religious belief, disability, or sexual orientation. 
Conversely, the relevant provisions of the Broadcasting Act 1989 and the FVPCA 
include too many features to be workable. The only mechanism with the correct 
approach to distinguishing features is the Press Council, which has no power to 
remedy the harm caused by the expression. 
Neither section 61 of the HRA, section 3(3)(e) of the FVPCA, the 
denigration principle applied by the BSA, nor the discrimination principle applied by 
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the Press Council contain a requirement that the expresser intend to cause a negative 
effect through its expression. The criminal offence contained in section 13 l of the 
HRA does include a requirement for intent, however, the section is not enforced. 
The absence of a requirement for intent is compounded by the broad 
requirement for effect in the each relevant provision. The provisions are broad and 
ambiguous, sometimes involving subjective elements. The HRA utilises the test 
"likely" to excite hostility. It is impossible to measure how "likely" would be 
applied. The FVPCA and discrimination principle applied by the Press Council do 
not require the expression to have any harmful effect. The expression must merely 
represent an idea. The problem of overbredth is sealed by a failure to provide 
express defences in all but the denigration principle applied by the BSA. 
The existing mechanisms do not operate effectively in practice. As noted 
above, section 131 of the HRA is not enforced. The Human Rights Commission has 
been inundated with trivial complaints under section 61. Section 3(3)(e) of the 
FVPCA is only a weighting factor subject to the censor's discretion. Section 3(3)(e) 
will not often be applied in practice because, as the Court in Living Word clarified, it 
is only a consideration where "matters such as sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or 
violence" accompany it. Neither the recommendations of the Select Committee 
Inquiry nor Marc Alexander's Members Bill will improve the inadequacy of section 
3(3)(e). Due to the breadth of the denigration principle provided under the 
Broadcasting Act 1989, the BSA has arbitrarily imposed a high standard to be met 
before the principle is applied. 
The ability for any of the mechanisms to provide an adequate remedy to 
targets, or punish expressers is also limited. Notably, the BSA and Press Council 
may not award financial compensation. The Press Council may only require the 
publication of its decision, a remedy it has no power to enforce. 
2 An illustrative problem 
The following example, invented by the author, demonstrates the inadequate 
approach to hate speech in ew Zealand at present. Imagine a magazine published 
m ew Zealand about women entitled "Wench". "Wench" is intended to explain 
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that women have lower intelligence than men, and are too emotional and irrational to 
operate in the workforce. It advocates that the only place for women is in the home, 
where they can service the needs of men, and be restricted from sexual promiscuity. 
"Wench" promotes the idea that women do not have the intelligence to take part in 
decisions pertaining to society, and should not be allowed to maintain positions of 
political power. It even suggests that it was a bad idea to give women the vote. 
"Wench" is obviously intended to denigrate and degrade women based upon 
their sex. The magazine actively seeks to promote the idea that women are inferior 
to men. The magazine has a strong following of men who are influenced by its 
message. 
"Wench" deals with material that discriminates on the basis of womens' sex, 
so could not be considered under section 61 or 131 of the HRA which only deal with 
race, colour, or ethnic or national origins . "Wench" is a publication within the 
meaning of the FVPCA, however, because it does not strictly deal with "matters 
such as sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence" it would not attract the weighting 
provision in section 3(3)(e) and could not be censored. Likewise, "Wench" could 
not be dealt with under the Broadcasting Act 1989 because it was not broadcast on 
television or radio. A member of the public could complain about "Wench" to the 
Press Council. However, even if the Press Council decided to exercise its broad 
discretion in the complainant's favour, the only remedy it could award would be to 
require "Wench" to publish a summary of the Council's decision, and it has no 
power to enforce this sanction. The Press Council has no power to fine the 
magazine, or award damages or an apology, and has no power to require "Wench" to 
be removed from circulation. 
"Wench" has developed a wide readership of men who are discouraging their 
wives and partners from working, and advocating a new role for women in New 
Zealand society. Women's refuge also records an increase in the amount of domestic 
abuse against women in ew Zealand. 
This example may seem far-fetched , but it effectively demonstrates an 
obvious gap in New Zealand law. I have explained the harm caused by hate speech, 
and the reasons that it must be regulated. Hate speech cannot be effectively 
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regulated in New Zealand at present. Consequently, this paper recommends 
legislative reform. 
B Proposed Legislative Reform 
I Criminal provision 
When discussing the possible ways to deal with hate speech, I concluded that 
the most appropriate method of dealing with hate speech is a mixture of criminal 
legislation and censorship. This approach recognises the seriousness of hate speech, 
would punish the expressers of hate speech and enable hate publications to be 
banned, and places the cost and burden of combating hate speech upon the state. 
The following criminal provision should be entered into the Human Rights 
Act 1993, repealing and replacing sections 61 and 131. 
131A. Hate Speech -
(1) Every person commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to 
imprisonment for a tem1 not exceeding 3 months or to a fine not exceeding 
$10,000 who communicates a message which: 
(a) is intended to denigrate or degrade a target group by reason of its 
sex, religious belief, colour, race, ethnic or national origins, 
disability, or sexual orientation; and 
(b) promotes the idea that the target group is inferior. 
(2) No person will be liable for an offence under subsection (1) of this 
section if the message communicated: 
(a) is true; or 
(b) expresses a religious opinion; or 
(c) concerns subject of public interest, the discussion of which is for the 
public benefit. 
The maximum sentence imposed upon people who commit the offence has 
been taken directly from the existing section 131 of the HRA, although the fine has 
been increased to reflect the gravity of the offence, and the time passed since section 
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131 was enacted.243 This paper does not consider the issue of sentencing in depth. It 
would need to be considered more extensively before such a provision was enacted. 
The option remains of further defining terms mentioned in the provision. 
For example, the word "message" could be defined in relation to the media it covers 
if the legislature was not comfortable with leaving that term undefined for the 
reasons stated at the beginning of this paper.244 
2 Censorship 
This paper recognised that aside from punishing the expressers of hate 
speech, New Zealand needs to remove hate speech from public circulation so that it 
cannot continue to cause harm. How hate speech should be censored is a difficult 
issue. Under the Canadian Criminal Code, a court may order the seizure and 
forfeiture of physical hate propaganda material kept on any premises for distribution 
or sale, or order publicly available hate propaganda to be deleted from computer 
systems.245 This is a viable option for New Zealand, however, ew Zealand already 
has an effective censorship regime provided for under the FVPCA, so using the 
censorship system to ban material amounting to hate speech may be a preferable 
approach. A provision could be entered into the FVPCA which makes hate speech 
objectionable. The provision could be a deeming provision, entered after the 
existing section 3(2) of the FVPCA. 
3. Meaning of" objectionable" -
(2A) A publication shall be deemed to be objectionable for the purposes of 
this Act if: 
(a) It has been found to communicate a message that is illegal under 
section 131 A of the Human Rights Act 1993 
To enter the above provision into the FVPCA would make the possession, 
distribution, and supply of hate speech an offence.246 The New Zealand Police and 
the Censorship Compliance Unit could work together to enable prosecution of 
expressers of hate speech, and censorship of publications amounting to hate speech. 
243 See Human Rights Act 1993, s 131(1). See Part IV BI (b) above. 
244 See Part 11 B 1 Message. 
245 Canadian Criminal Code, art 320. 
246 Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993, ss 123, 124, and 13. 
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C Impact on Freedom of Expression 
I The right to freedom of expression 
The right to freedom of expression is contained in section 14 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Bill ofRights) .
247 
14. Freedom of Expression - Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, 
including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart infonnation and opinions of 
any kind in any form. 
The right to freedom of expression under the Bill of Rights would be limited if 
the legislation were passed . Individuals could not seek, receive, or impart 
information or opinions amounting to hate speech as to do so would be a punishable 
offence. The right to seek, receive, or impart information or opinions amounting to 
hate speech through publications coming within the jurisdiction of the FVPCA 
would also be restricted. 
2 Reasonable limit on freedom of expression? 
Section 5 of the Bill of Rights provides that any limitation its rights and 
freedoms must constitute "such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society".
248 It should be noted that 
the Bill of Rights is not supreme law, so if section 14 is limited by the proposed 
legislation, Parliament still has the power to enact the legislation and the courts have 
no power strike t~e legislation down for inconsistency with the Bill of Right~.
249 
If the proposed legislation came before the house, it is likely that the 
Attorney-General would report to Parliament on whether the bill was inconsistent 
with rights contained in the Bill of Rights , specifically article 14. To do so would 
involve a consideration of whether any limitation created was demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society.250
 
247 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
248 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
249 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 4 . 
250 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
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The Court of Appeal in Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review 
(Moonen/51 set out an approach for determining whether limitations are 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. The Moonen approach may 
be seen as a restatement of the test set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v 
Oakes252. R v Oakes dealt with the Canadian provision upon which section 5 was 
based, which also requires limitations of rights contained in the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms to be "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society" .253 
(a) Importance of objective 
The objective the proposed legislation is to protect society from the 
dissemination of hateful messages in New Zealand. The Supreme Court of Canada 
in R v Oakes held that "an objective relates to concerns which are pressing and 
substantial in a free and democratic society". 
254 This paper has demonstrated that the 
need to protect targets and society generally from hate speech is a pressing issue 
because of the harm hate speech causes.
255 The targets of hate speech may suffer 
physical and psychological harm, and may become depressed and withdrawn as they 
are degraded and denigrated and made to feel inferior. Hate speech may reduce 
inter-group relations between the targeted and the non-targeted, and harm society by 
promoting the message that the target group is inferior, which may lead to increased 
hostility, discrimination and violence. 
(b) Reasonable proportionality 
The Court of Appeal in Moonen directed that "[t]he way in which the 
objective is statutorily achieved must be in reasonable proportion to the importance 
of the objective. A sledgehammer should not be used to crack a nut".
256 I have 
contended that hate speech causes serious harm. It is an emotional assault upon its 
25 1 Moon en v Film and Literature Board of Review (Moonen) [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 16-17 (CA) 
Tipping J for the Court. 
252 R v Oakes [1986] I SCR 103, 138-9 (Supreme Court of Canada) Dickson CJC. 
253 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 1. 
254 R v Oakes, above, 138 Dickson CJC. 
255 See Part III A The Hann Caused by Hate Speech. 
256 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review (Moonen) [2000] 2 ZLR 9, 16 (CA) Tipping 
J for the Court. 
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targets, which may manifest in physical and psychological symptoms. It causes 
inequality and discrimination within society, and may encourage violence. 
Prohibiting hate speech places a limitation on the right to freedom of 
expression. However, that limitation is greatly outweighed by the harm resulting 
from allowing hate speech to exist. The limit on freedom of expression posed for 
New Zealand through the proposed legislation would not affect legitimate 
expression, which was not intended to denigrate or degrade, or true expression, 
religious expression, and expression of public interest. 
( c) Rational connection 
The Court in R v Oakes held that limitations on rights must be "carefully 
designed" to achieve the objective and should not be "[a]rbitrary, unfair, or based on 
irrational considerations" .257
 The proposed criminal legislation has been carefully 
formulated to ensure the offence is narrowly tailored to protecting against the 
dissemination of hate speech. The offence includes a requirement for intent to 
prevent it being applied either too broadly, or to situations where the expresser did 
not mean their message to denigrate or degrade. The offence includes express 
defences for true speech, religious speech and speech in the public interest. The 
defences ensure that the offence is not applied to prevent or chill legitimate speech. 
Similarly, the censorship provision will only apply once the criminal offence has 
been satisfied. Accordingly, the way in which the proposed legislation has been 
worded, and the way it will operate in practice, is reasonably in proportion to the 
objective of protecting society from the dissemination of hate speech, and will not 
extend to cover situations beyond its objective. 
(d) Little interference with the right 
The proposed legislation limits the right to freedom of expression as little as 
possible in order to meet the objective of protecting society from the dissemination 
of hate speech. This is done through the requirement for intent and the provision of 
defences for legitimate speech. 
257 R v Oakes, above, 139 Dickson CJC. 
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3 Conclusion 
I believe that the proposed leg;islation is a reasonable limit prescribed by law 
to the right to freedom of expression, which is demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.
258 The Court in Moonen explained that determining whether 
legislation constitutes a reasonable limit on a right contained in the Bill of Rights is a 
value judgement.259 This paper recommends that that value judgement should be 
exercised in favour of passing such legislation to protect New Zealand society and 
New Zealand individuals from the harms caused by hate speech. 
VI CONCLUSION 
Regulation of hate speech is imperative to protect individual targets , and 
New Zealand society, form its real and serious harms. Those interested in hate 
speech regulation in New Zealand have, to date, concerned themselves with the 
ability of existing mechanisms to deal with it. I believe they are focusing on the 
wrong issue. 
As I have demonstrated, the ability for existing mechanisms to regulate hate 
speech in New Zealand is deeply inadequate. Not only do the mechanisms fail to 
address the harms caused by hate speech, they are operated under broad and 
ambiguous provisions that threaten freedom of expression. New Zealand should not 
concern itself with making an inadequate, gap-ridden regulation work. The issue of 
hate speech regulation in New Zealand requires a paradigm shift. We must ask, 
what type of hateful speech requires regulation? How should this be done? 
I have considered and concluded upon the nature of expression to be 
regulated, and have proposed a new, unified, and comprehensive regime for 
regulating hate speech in New Zealand. Not only do I consider the limit my 
proposal places on freedom of expression to be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society, I believe the proposal vital to ensure and promote the equality 
and dignity of all people in New Zealand. 
258 ote that the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Keegstra found that the Canadian Criminal 
Codes offence of wilfully promoting hatred was constituted a limit on the right to freedom of 
expression contained in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which was demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. 
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